T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:78- Finding
Unverified Remote Installation Script Is Executed Directly by a Shell
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill mostly matches read-only Umeng analytics, but it adds mandatory telemetry with an app identifier and recommends risky CLI installation methods, so users should review it before installing.
Install only if you are comfortable with umeng-cli being installed globally, storing Umeng login credentials, and making authenticated calls to Umeng. Do not use the curl-to-sh installer; prefer a pinned and verified package version. Treat AppKey/dataSourceId as sensitive application metadata and avoid or disable the trace commands unless you explicitly consent to that telemetry.
SKILL.md:78Unverified Remote Installation Script Is Executed Directly by a Shell
SKILL.md:33Mandatory Agent Telemetry Transmits a User-Provided Application Identifier
SKILL.md:75Unpinned Global Installation of a Security-Sensitive CLI Package
Piping a network response straight into sh creates an immediate command-execution chain with no validation barrier. In agent or automated environments, this is especially dangerous because it can lead to arbitrary code execution under the current user context if the fetched script is altered or malicious.
npm install -g @umengfe/umeng-cli
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/umeng/umeng-cli/main/scripts/install.sh | sh
安装完成后再次运行 `umeng-cli --version` 验证。
The mandated umeng-cli trace command performs telemetry unrelated to the user’s analytics query and is not necessary to fulfill the stated read-only analysis purpose. Unnecessary outbound reporting increases privacy risk and creates a hidden side effect every time the skill is used.
The skill instructs the agent to send skill and appkey metadata externally without an explicit user-facing warning at the point of collection or transmission. This undermines informed consent and can leak tenant-identifying information to a third party without the user realizing it.
The skill explicitly tells the agent to report the user-provided AppKey via telemetry. Even if an AppKey is not a secret credential, it is still sensitive tenant/application metadata that can identify the user’s asset and should not be exfiltrated without a strong need and consent.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
若用户未提供 appkey:
umeng-cli-uapp-assets 查询小程序列表,取得 dataSourceId:
umeng-cli call '{"name":"umeng.umini.getAppList","api":{"method":"GET","baseUrl":"https://gateway.open.umeng.com/openapi","endpoint":"param2/1/com.umeng.umini/umeng.umini.getAppList","authType":"umeng-aksk"}}' '{"pageIndex":1,"pageSize":100}'
The skill claims the capability is limited to 5 read-only business interfaces, but it also instructs the agent to execute extra commands for telemetry and app discovery. This is a documentation-integrity issue because it expands behavior beyond the stated scope, which can mislead operators and hide secondary data flows.
The skill recommends fetching and executing a remote shell script directly from the network via curl ... | sh. This pattern bypasses review of the downloaded content and creates a supply-chain execution risk if the source, transport, or repository is compromised.
npm install -g @umengfe/umeng-cli
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/umeng/umeng-cli/main/scripts/install.sh | sh
安装完成后再次运行 `umeng-cli --version` 验证。
No suspicious patterns detected.