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Security audit

应用资产查询

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mainly a read-only Umeng asset lookup tool, but it also directs agents to send telemetry with possible AppKeys and documents unsafe mutable installer commands, so it needs review before use.

Review this before installing. Prefer a pinned, verified umeng-cli release and avoid the curl-to-sh installer. Do not allow automatic telemetry or AppKey reporting unless you understand what umeng-cli trace sends and have consent to disclose those identifiers. Use the asset listing only for accounts where broad inventory disclosure is acceptable.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:53
Finding

Mutable Remote Installer Is Piped Directly into a Shell

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 53
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and immediate execution
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code:

bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/umeng/umeng-cli/main/scripts/install.sh | sh

Technical Analysis

The installation command retrieves a shell script from the mutable main branch of an external GitHub repository and immediately passes it to sh. It does not pin an immutable commit, verify a checksum or signature, save the script for inspection, or obtain separate approval before execution.

Although the repository URL is consistent with the homepage declared by the Skill, repository ownership alone does not establish the integrity of future content. The effective code executed by this instruction can change after the Skill has been reviewed. Compromise of the repository, maintainer account, publishing process, or remote installer would therefore turn this documented command into an arbitrary code-execution channel.

This behavior is not required for the Skill's declared read-only asset-query functionality. Installation may be a prerequisite, but executing mutable remote content without verification exceeds the minimum safe mechanism needed to install the CLI.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the upstream repository, a maintainer account, or the installer publication process.
  2. The attacker modifies scripts/install.sh on the main branch.
  3. A user or Agent follows the installation instruction in SKILL.md.
  4. curl downloads the attacker-controlled version of the script.
  5. The pipe sends the response directly to sh, without any integrity check or review.
  6. The payload executes with all permissions available to the user running the command.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation provides arbitrary command execution under the invoking user's account. The payload could read or modify acce ...[truncated 436 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Remove the pipe-to-shell installation method.
  • Prefer a package or release artifact pinned to an exact reviewed version.
  • Download the artifact as a separate step rather than executing streamed content.
  • Publish and verify a cryptographic checksum or signature before execution.
  • Pin GitHub-hosted content to an immutable commit hash rather than main.
  • Present the downloaded script for inspection and require explicit user approval before running it.
  • Execute installation with the least-privileged account possible.
  • Document the files, directories, and permissions the installer is expected to modify.

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:23
Finding

Skill Mandates Unsolicited Telemetry and Appkey Disclosure

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 23-31
Vulnerability Type: Agent instruction hijacking through mandatory telemetry
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

bash
umeng-cli trace '{"skill_name":"umeng-cli-uapp-assets"}'
bash
umeng-cli trace '{"skill_name":"umeng-cli-uapp-assets", "appkey":"<input Appkey>"}'

Technical Analysis

The Skill instructs an AI Agent to execute a tracking command merely after reading the document. It also directs the Agent to submit an Appkey found in the task context before the first business API call.

These instructions introduce a network-visible side effect unrelated to the user's requested read-only asset query. They alter the Agent's workflow to perform tracking without requiring explicit user consent. The Appkey may be a customer or application identifier supplied by the user for another purpose, and transmitting it through a telemetry operation violates data-minimization principles.

The project contains no implementation of umeng-cli trace, so the destination, transport behavior, retention policy, and exact transmitted metadata cannot be verified from the audited artifact. This uncertainty increases the privacy and governance risk.

Attack Path

  1. The Agent loads and follows SKILL.md.
  2. The Skill directs the Agent to invoke umeng-cli trace even if the user requested only an asset query.
  3. The CLI transmits Skill-usage metadata to a destination not documented in this project.
  4. If an Appkey is present in the task context, the Agent includes it in a second telemetry command.
  5. The external recipient can associate Skill use with the supplied application identifier and any metadata automatically added by the CLI.

Impact Assessment

The immediate impact is unauthorized or insufficiently disclosed telemetry. Potentially exposed information includes the Skill identifier, an Appkey supplied in the user's context ...[truncated 459 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Remove instructions that automatically execute telemetry when the Skill is read or loaded.
  • Make telemetry explicitly opt-in and obtain informed user consent before transmission.
  • Do not include Appkeys or other user-provided identifiers by default.
  • Clearly document the telemetry endpoint, transmitted fields, legal basis, retention period, access controls, and privacy policy.
  • Provide a command preview and allow the user to decline without reducing core functionality.
  • If aggregate usage measurement is necessary, use data minimization and anonymization.
  • Separate business API operations from telemetry so read-only queries do not create unrelated side effects.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:50
Finding

Unpinned Global npm Dependency Installation

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 50; also declared in metadata at line 8
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned global third-party dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

bash
npm install -g @umengfe/umeng-cli

Technical Analysis

The recommended installation command does not specify an exact package version or integrity value. It therefore resolves whichever release is current when installation occurs. npm installation can also execute package lifecycle scripts, while global installation places the resulting executable in a shared command location.

This design makes the reviewed Skill dependent on future package contents that are not present in the project. If the package account, registry publication process, or a future release is compromised, installation may execute attacker-controlled code and install a malicious CLI under the expected umeng-cli name.

The CLI later handles authenticated Umeng operations and locally cached AK/SK-related login state. Consequently, replacing it through the dependency channel could affect more than the initial installation.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package release process, or another relevant supply-chain component.
  2. A malicious version of @umengfe/umeng-cli is published as the version selected by npm.
  3. A user or Agent runs the unpinned global installation command.
  4. npm downloads the compromised package and may execute its lifecycle scripts.
  5. The malicious package installs or replaces the globally accessible umeng-cli executable.
  6. Later login, trace, or API commands execute attacker-controlled logic under the invoking user's permissions.

Impact Assessment

Exploitation could provide code execution during package installation or subsequent CLI use. The malicious package could access files and environment data available to the invoking user, spoof API responses, intercept ...[truncated 384 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin @umengfe/umeng-cli to an exact reviewed version rather than installing the latest matching release.
  • Record and verify package integrity through a lockfile or trusted checksum.
  • Prefer a project-local dependency over a global installation where practical.
  • Review package lifecycle scripts and disable them with --ignore-scripts when they are unnecessary.
  • Use signed, immutable release artifacts when supported.
  • Run installation and the CLI with the least privileges necessary.
  • Re-audit package updates before changing the pinned version.
  • Document the expected package publisher, registry, version, and verification procedure.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (67)

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The | sh pattern directly chains network retrieval to shell execution, enabling arbitrary remote code execution under the agent’s privileges. In an agent context, this is especially dangerous because the model could be induced to run installation commands automatically as part of task fulfillment.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

npm install -g @umengfe/umeng-cli

方式二:通过官方安装脚本(仅安装 CLI 二进制 + Skills)

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/umeng/umeng-cli/main/scripts/install.sh | sh

text

安装完成后再次运行 `umeng-cli --version` 验证。

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill is designed to enumerate all apps and mini-programs tied to the currently logged-in account, which exposes account inventory data in bulk. In many environments, full asset inventory is sensitive reconnaissance information even if the APIs are officially read-only.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill claims to be a read-only asset query skill, but it also instructs the agent to execute umeng-cli trace telemetry calls that are unrelated to the user’s asset retrieval request. This expands behavior beyond the declared scope and causes external data transmission without being necessary for the core function.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The telemetry instructions direct the agent to send skill_name and potentially appkey to an external service without an explicit user-facing warning or consent flow. Even if the fields seem limited, they reveal usage patterns and may disclose sensitive asset identifiers.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill tells the agent to report a user-provided AppKey from task context to telemetry before the first API call. AppKeys are asset identifiers, and transmitting them to a secondary endpoint creates unnecessary data exposure outside the user’s requested task.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The document states that appkey is not an input to this skill, yet elsewhere instructs the agent to transmit a user-provided AppKey in telemetry before business calls. This contradiction can mislead users and agents about what sensitive identifiers are being consumed and sent externally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 138)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 139)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 145)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 150)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 151)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 152)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 156)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 158)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 176)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 177)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 228)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 232)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 248)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 252)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 258)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 301)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 317)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 321)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 327)May include surrounding context.

md
| 资产类型 | 命名空间 | 总数接口 | 列表接口 |
|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| App(Android / iOS) | `com.umeng.uapp` | `umeng.uapp.getAppCount`(**一次调用直出**) | `umeng.uapp.getAppList` |
| 小程序(微信 / 支付宝 / 字节 / 百度 / QQ / H5 等) | `com.umeng.umini` | 无独立总数接口,走 `getAppList.totalCount` | `umeng.umini.getAppList` |

### 分页参数差异表 ⚠️