T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:53- Finding
Mutable Remote Installer Is Piped Directly into a Shell
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 53
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and immediate execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code:
bash curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/umeng/umeng-cli/main/scripts/install.sh | shTechnical Analysis
The installation command retrieves a shell script from the mutable
mainbranch of an external GitHub repository and immediately passes it tosh. It does not pin an immutable commit, verify a checksum or signature, save the script for inspection, or obtain separate approval before execution.Although the repository URL is consistent with the homepage declared by the Skill, repository ownership alone does not establish the integrity of future content. The effective code executed by this instruction can change after the Skill has been reviewed. Compromise of the repository, maintainer account, publishing process, or remote installer would therefore turn this documented command into an arbitrary code-execution channel.
This behavior is not required for the Skill's declared read-only asset-query functionality. Installation may be a prerequisite, but executing mutable remote content without verification exceeds the minimum safe mechanism needed to install the CLI.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream repository, a maintainer account, or the installer publication process.
- The attacker modifies
scripts/install.shon themainbranch. - A user or Agent follows the installation instruction in
SKILL.md. curldownloads the attacker-controlled version of the script.- The pipe sends the response directly to
sh, without any integrity check or review. - The payload executes with all permissions available to the user running the command.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation provides arbitrary command execution under the invoking user's account. The payload could read or modify acce ...[truncated 436 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the pipe-to-shell installation method.
- Prefer a package or release artifact pinned to an exact reviewed version.
- Download the artifact as a separate step rather than executing streamed content.
- Publish and verify a cryptographic checksum or signature before execution.
- Pin GitHub-hosted content to an immutable commit hash rather than
main. - Present the downloaded script for inspection and require explicit user approval before running it.
- Execute installation with the least-privileged account possible.
- Document the files, directories, and permissions the installer is expected to modify.
