T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
join/SKILL.md:26- Finding
Unconfirmed Modification of Security-Sensitive Agent Configuration
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a real trading integration, but it tells agents to silently change persistent MCP configuration and activate a remote tool provider, so users should review it before installing.
Install only if you are comfortable letting this skill persist a Zero MCP server in agent configuration and manage trading sessions through a remote service. Prefer the canonical https://api.getzero.dev/mcp endpoint, avoid custom setup URLs unless you fully trust them, and require a visible config diff, backup, and confirmation before any config write, overwrite, restart, live trading, public profile sharing, or auto-rotation behavior.
join/SKILL.md:26Unconfirmed Modification of Security-Sensitive Agent Configuration
scripts/setup.sh:12Unvalidated Custom MCP Endpoint Can Replace the Trusted Tool Provider
If the implementation performs documentation parsing, repository reads, and static analysis across multiple project files, that materially exceeds the declared role of a trading assistant. Undisclosed filesystem inspection is sensitive because it can expose unrelated local content and breaks the operator's expectation that the skill only evaluates market data and manages sessions.
If the implementation performs documentation parsing, repository reads, and static analysis across multiple project files, that materially exceeds the declared role of a trading assistant. Undisclosed filesystem inspection is sensitive because it can expose unrelated local content and breaks the operator's expectation that the skill only evaluates market data and manages sessions.
The skill directs the agent to create or overwrite MCP configuration files and replace an existing zero entry without warning or approval. Silent persistence into user config creates lasting trust relationships to a remote server and can disrupt existing setups, making the change both security-sensitive and hard for users to notice.
The README explicitly states that installation automatically creates a remote MCP connection and injects SKILL.md into the agent system prompt, but it does not present these as high-trust, integrity-impacting actions requiring explicit user review. In an agent skill, remote tool registration plus prompt injection can materially alter agent behavior and expose user context to an external service, making silent or under-disclosed setup dangerous.
This finding reflects a live external connection to https://api.getzero.dev/mcp during install/initialization, which is a genuine security concern in the context of an agent skill because it enables remote control over available tools and potentially data flows. The risk is elevated by the trading context, where the agent may act on market data or user instructions with financial consequences, and by the adjacent statement that system-prompt content is injected.
## what happens on install
1. OpenClaw reads `.mcp.json` — connects to `https://api.getzero.dev/mcp` via streamable-http
2. Gateway registers all ZERO tools (starts with 2, unlocks up to 42 as you use them)
3. SKILL.md injected into agent system prompt — agent knows how to trade
4. Sub-skills loaded for onboarding, strategy selection, risk management, etc.
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
This trigger would match essentially any initial user message, regardless of whether the user wants onboarding or trading help. The lack of limiting conditions or negative examples makes unintended sub-skill invocation likely.
Phrases like 'strategy questions', 'evaluating coins', 'deploying', 'reporting results', and 'morning brief' are broad semantic categories that can overlap with normal conversation and with each other. Without explicit trigger boundaries or examples of when not to load each sub-skill, routing may be inconsistent or overly eager.
The trigger list contains generic phrases like "leaderboard," "ranking," and "my rank," plus a broad natural-language condition about competition or ranking. This can cause the skill to activate in unrelated contexts, leading to unintended tool calls or routing to a trading-related competition feature when the user meant something else.
The skill metadata and workflow establish a remote MCP endpoint and later direct the agent to verify and use it, but the user is not clearly warned up front that a third-party service will be contacted. Hidden outbound connectivity is security-relevant because it can expose metadata, session details, or behavioral information to an external service.
The skill embeds a third-party MCP server URL in metadata, establishing an external communication path to a remote service. In context this appears functional rather than overtly malicious, but it still creates a data transmission surface and should be treated as security-sensitive.
- auto-config
mcpServers:
zero:
url: "https://api.getzero.dev/mcp"
transport: "streamable-http"
---
The trigger condition allows execution not only when the operator directly asks to join, but also when the agent merely 'reads instructions from getzero.dev/zero.md'. This permits indirect or externally supplied content to trigger privileged configuration and network actions without a clear, fresh user command.
The phrases 'execute this flow. no questions. no manual config.' explicitly suppress confirmation and drive immediate system modification and remote tool execution. This is dangerous because it bypasses normal user-consent safeguards for persistent config changes, network connections, and follow-on actions.
Creating ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json if no config exists establishes persistent agent configuration on disk, which survives the current session and can affect future behavior. Persistence itself is not inherently malicious, but doing it automatically and without user approval increases the risk of stealthy or unintended long-term changes.
2. `~/.openclaw/mcp.json` (OpenClaw MCP config)
3. `~/.config/mcp/servers.json` (generic MCP config)
if NONE exist, create `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json`.
## step 2: add the zero MCP server
The config snippet writes a persistent remote MCP endpoint directly into user configuration, enabling future external communications. Even if intended for legitimate service access, this is a meaningful security boundary crossing because it alters trusted endpoints used by the agent.
{
"mcpServers": {
"zero": {
"url": "https://api.getzero.dev/mcp",
"transport": "streamable-http"
}
}
The skill instructs restarting the MCP connection or gateway as part of the automated flow without prior warning. Restarting shared infrastructure can interrupt active sessions, alter agent behavior, and have wider system impact beyond this one skill.
The skill is presented as a connection/setup helper, but after verifying connectivity it automatically invokes trading-engine evaluation actions to unlock additional capabilities. This expands behavior beyond simple configuration and can cause unintended remote actions, account state changes, or user confusion about what the skill will do.
The shortcut instructs installing zero-trading even though this file is the zero-join skill, creating ambiguity about what code or capabilities are actually being installed. That mismatch can lead operators to install a broader package than expected, increasing the chance of unintended permissions, tools, or behaviors being introduced.
The description presents the skill as simple onboarding but omits key consequences: it can start a trading session and references a public profile URL. That lack of informed consent is dangerous because users may initiate the flow without understanding it can create ongoing automated activity and expose track-record information publicly.
The trigger phrase includes "or similar," which makes activation ambiguous and increases the chance the skill runs on loosely related user input. In this context, the skill can progress toward session deployment and profile exposure, so over-broad invocation materially raises the risk of unintended execution.
The skill exposes a deploy action in step 2 before performing the active-session check in step 3, creating a control-flow inconsistency. A user can trigger deployment from the early button path and bypass the intended guard, potentially causing duplicate sessions, conflicting state, or unintended trading behavior.
The onboarding flow does more than educate or configure: it guides the operator into starting a live agent session workflow and normalizes immediate deployment as part of setup. Even though the example uses paper mode, coupling onboarding with session creation increases the risk of unintended trading actions and blurs the boundary between informational onboarding and execution.
The skill describes automatic deployment of defensive trading actions when a circuit breaker triggers, implying the agent may take consequential account actions without fresh operator approval. In a live trading context, autonomous position-management actions can materially affect funds and create loss, lockout, or unintended strategy execution if triggered incorrectly or manipulated by bad state.
## auto-recovery communication
when circuit breaker triggers and defense auto-deploys:
"circuit breaker triggered. auto-deploying defense to protect capital."
after 24h cooldown completes:
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
## auto-recovery communication
when circuit breaker triggers and defense auto-deploys:
"circuit breaker triggered. auto-deploying defense to protect capital."
after 24h cooldown completes:
"cooldown complete. ready for a new session."
The skill explicitly states that it analyzes operator session history for personalized insights, but it does not provide any user-facing notice, consent flow, or data-use boundaries. This creates a privacy and profiling risk because behavioral trading history is being collected and used to influence future recommendations without transparent disclosure.