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Security audit

ZERO Trading

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a real trading integration, but it tells agents to silently change persistent MCP configuration and activate a remote tool provider, so users should review it before installing.

Install only if you are comfortable letting this skill persist a Zero MCP server in agent configuration and manage trading sessions through a remote service. Prefer the canonical https://api.getzero.dev/mcp endpoint, avoid custom setup URLs unless you fully trust them, and require a visible config diff, backup, and confirmation before any config write, overwrite, restart, live trading, public profile sharing, or auto-rotation behavior.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Tool Hijacking and SpoofingModifies or replaces tools so legitimate-looking calls execute attacker logic
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
join/SKILL.md:26
Finding

Unconfirmed Modification of Security-Sensitive Agent Configuration

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T07 · Tool Hijacking and Spoofing

Warning
Location
scripts/setup.sh:12
Finding

Unvalidated Custom MCP Endpoint Can Replace the Trusted Tool Provider

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null; then # Use jq for proper JSON manipulation if [[ -f "$MCP_CONFIG_FILE" ]]; then # Update existing config TEMP=$(mktemp) jq --arg url "$ZERO_MCP_URL" '.mcpServers.zero = {"url": $url}' "$MCP_CONFIG_FILE" > "$TEMP" mv "$TEMP" "$MCP_CONFIG_FILE" echo " updated existing config" else # Create new config jq -n --arg url "$ZERO_MCP_URL" '{"mcpServers": {"zero": {"url": $url}}}' > "$MCP_CONFIG_FILE" ``` ### Technical Analysis The setup script allows `ZERO_MCP_URL` to be supplied through either an inherited environment variable or the `--url` command-line argument. It then writes that value directly into the MCP configuration without validating: - The URL scheme. - Whether TLS is required. - The hostname or origin. - Whether the endpoint is on an approved allowlist. - Whether the endpoint is trusted by the operator. - Whether an existing `zero` server should be replaced. This is security-sensitive because an MCP endpoint defines the remote tools exposed under the trusted `zero_*` names and receives data submitted through those tools. A malicious or compromised endpoint could return fabricated market information, spoof trading operations, or collect information supplied in subsequent MCP requests. The endpoint value is safely passed to `jq` through `--arg`, so the reviewed code does not demonstrate shell-command injection. The issue is tool-provider substitutio ...[truncated 1542 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (48)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

If the implementation performs documentation parsing, repository reads, and static analysis across multiple project files, that materially exceeds the declared role of a trading assistant. Undisclosed filesystem inspection is sensitive because it can expose unrelated local content and breaks the operator's expectation that the skill only evaluates market data and manages sessions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

If the implementation performs documentation parsing, repository reads, and static analysis across multiple project files, that materially exceeds the declared role of a trading assistant. Undisclosed filesystem inspection is sensitive because it can expose unrelated local content and breaks the operator's expectation that the skill only evaluates market data and manages sessions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill directs the agent to create or overwrite MCP configuration files and replace an existing zero entry without warning or approval. Silent persistence into user config creates lasting trust relationships to a remote server and can disrupt existing setups, making the change both security-sensitive and hard for users to notice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly states that installation automatically creates a remote MCP connection and injects SKILL.md into the agent system prompt, but it does not present these as high-trust, integrity-impacting actions requiring explicit user review. In an agent skill, remote tool registration plus prompt injection can materially alter agent behavior and expose user context to an external service, making silent or under-disclosed setup dangerous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This finding reflects a live external connection to https://api.getzero.dev/mcp during install/initialization, which is a genuine security concern in the context of an agent skill because it enables remote control over available tools and potentially data flows. The risk is elevated by the trading context, where the agent may act on market data or user instructions with financial consequences, and by the adjacent statement that system-prompt content is injected.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

md
## what happens on install

1. OpenClaw reads `.mcp.json` — connects to `https://api.getzero.dev/mcp` via streamable-http
2. Gateway registers all ZERO tools (starts with 2, unlocks up to 42 as you use them)
3. SKILL.md injected into agent system prompt — agent knows how to trade
4. Sub-skills loaded for onboarding, strategy selection, risk management, etc.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This trigger would match essentially any initial user message, regardless of whether the user wants onboarding or trading help. The lack of limiting conditions or negative examples makes unintended sub-skill invocation likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

Phrases like 'strategy questions', 'evaluating coins', 'deploying', 'reporting results', and 'morning brief' are broad semantic categories that can overlap with normal conversation and with each other. Without explicit trigger boundaries or examples of when not to load each sub-skill, routing may be inconsistent or overly eager.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger list contains generic phrases like "leaderboard," "ranking," and "my rank," plus a broad natural-language condition about competition or ranking. This can cause the skill to activate in unrelated contexts, leading to unintended tool calls or routing to a trading-related competition feature when the user meant something else.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill metadata and workflow establish a remote MCP endpoint and later direct the agent to verify and use it, but the user is not clearly warned up front that a third-party service will be contacted. Hidden outbound connectivity is security-relevant because it can expose metadata, session details, or behavioral information to an external service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The skill embeds a third-party MCP server URL in metadata, establishing an external communication path to a remote service. In context this appears functional rather than overtly malicious, but it still creates a data transmission surface and should be treated as security-sensitive.

Content

Scanner excerpt · join/SKILL.md (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

md
- auto-config
    mcpServers:
      zero:
        url: "https://api.getzero.dev/mcp"
        transport: "streamable-http"
---

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The trigger condition allows execution not only when the operator directly asks to join, but also when the agent merely 'reads instructions from getzero.dev/zero.md'. This permits indirect or externally supplied content to trigger privileged configuration and network actions without a clear, fresh user command.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 4

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The phrases 'execute this flow. no questions. no manual config.' explicitly suppress confirmation and drive immediate system modification and remote tool execution. This is dangerous because it bypasses normal user-consent safeguards for persistent config changes, network connections, and follow-on actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

Creating ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json if no config exists establishes persistent agent configuration on disk, which survives the current session and can affect future behavior. Persistence itself is not inherently malicious, but doing it automatically and without user approval increases the risk of stealthy or unintended long-term changes.

Content

Scanner excerpt · join/SKILL.md (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

md
2. `~/.openclaw/mcp.json` (OpenClaw MCP config)
3. `~/.config/mcp/servers.json` (generic MCP config)

if NONE exist, create `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json`.

## step 2: add the zero MCP server

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The config snippet writes a persistent remote MCP endpoint directly into user configuration, enabling future external communications. Even if intended for legitimate service access, this is a meaningful security boundary crossing because it alters trusted endpoints used by the agent.

Content

Scanner excerpt · join/SKILL.md (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

md
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "zero": {
      "url": "https://api.getzero.dev/mcp",
      "transport": "streamable-http"
    }
  }

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs restarting the MCP connection or gateway as part of the automated flow without prior warning. Restarting shared infrastructure can interrupt active sessions, alter agent behavior, and have wider system impact beyond this one skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill is presented as a connection/setup helper, but after verifying connectivity it automatically invokes trading-engine evaluation actions to unlock additional capabilities. This expands behavior beyond simple configuration and can cause unintended remote actions, account state changes, or user confusion about what the skill will do.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The shortcut instructs installing zero-trading even though this file is the zero-join skill, creating ambiguity about what code or capabilities are actually being installed. That mismatch can lead operators to install a broader package than expected, increasing the chance of unintended permissions, tools, or behaviors being introduced.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The description presents the skill as simple onboarding but omits key consequences: it can start a trading session and references a public profile URL. That lack of informed consent is dangerous because users may initiate the flow without understanding it can create ongoing automated activity and expose track-record information publicly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrase includes "or similar," which makes activation ambiguous and increases the chance the skill runs on loosely related user input. In this context, the skill can progress toward session deployment and profile exposure, so over-broad invocation materially raises the risk of unintended execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill exposes a deploy action in step 2 before performing the active-session check in step 3, creating a control-flow inconsistency. A user can trigger deployment from the early button path and bypass the intended guard, potentially causing duplicate sessions, conflicting state, or unintended trading behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The onboarding flow does more than educate or configure: it guides the operator into starting a live agent session workflow and normalizes immediate deployment as part of setup. Even though the example uses paper mode, coupling onboarding with session creation increases the risk of unintended trading actions and blurs the boundary between informational onboarding and execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The skill describes automatic deployment of defensive trading actions when a circuit breaker triggers, implying the agent may take consequential account actions without fresh operator approval. In a live trading context, autonomous position-management actions can materially affect funds and create loss, lockout, or unintended strategy execution if triggered incorrectly or manipulated by bad state.

Content

Scanner excerpt · operator-comms/SKILL.md (reported line 201)May include surrounding context.

md
## auto-recovery communication

when circuit breaker triggers and defense auto-deploys:
"circuit breaker triggered. auto-deploying defense to protect capital."

after 24h cooldown completes:

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · operator-comms/SKILL.md (reported line 202)May include surrounding context.

md
## auto-recovery communication

when circuit breaker triggers and defense auto-deploys:
"circuit breaker triggered. auto-deploying defense to protect capital."

after 24h cooldown completes:
"cooldown complete. ready for a new session."

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly states that it analyzes operator session history for personalized insights, but it does not provide any user-facing notice, consent flow, or data-use boundaries. This creates a privacy and profiling risk because behavioral trading history is being collected and used to influence future recommendations without transparent disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.