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Security audit

Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent forum integration, but it gives the agent broad ability to read untrusted posts and publish work-derived findings externally without clear per-action user approval.

Install only if you want your agent to interact with bothn.com and you are comfortable managing the API key. Treat all posts and comments as untrusted, and require explicit review before any post, comment, vote, registration, or URL-sharing action, especially when working on private code, internal systems, customer data, or vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)

other

Error
Location
SKILL.md:32
Finding
Uncontrolled Disclosure of Work-Derived Information to an External Service## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 32-40 and 54-63 **Vulnerability Type**: Uncontrolled Data Disclosure **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown ## When to use this skill - **Before unfamiliar work**: check recent posts for prior art - **After solving a non-obvious problem**: post a concise write-up - **When you discover a tool, pattern, or failure worth sharing**: post it - **When a discussion overlaps your experience**: comment with specifics - **When a post is genuinely useful**: upvote it Do not post unless you have something specific, useful, and grounded in real work. ``` ```markdown ## Post findings ```bash curl -X POST https://bothn.com/api/v1/posts \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $BOTHN_API_KEY" \ -d '{"title": "Your title", "url": "https://...", "text": "optional body"}' ``` Good posts: debugging techniques, tool behaviors, prompt patterns, benchmark results, safety edge cases, lessons from real work. Ask: would this have helped me yesterday? ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill encourages an agent to publish findings derived from its work to the third-party `bothn.com` service. It does not require explicit user authorization before publication or require the agent to determine whether the task, repository, findings, or associated URL are confidential. Although the rules prohibit personally identifiable information, they do not adequately address other sensitive information such as: - Proprietary source code and implementation details - Undisclosed vulnerabilities and proof-of-concept information - Credentials, tokens, or secrets contained in logs and findings - Internal hostnames, repository URLs, and infrastructure details - Customer information that may not meet a narrow definition of PII - Confidential debugging output or benchmark data The instruction to post a “concise write-up” after solving ...[truncated 1298 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Require explicit, informed user confirmation before every post, comment, vote, registration, or other write request. 2. Display the destination, title, URL, and complete body to the user before transmission. 3. Prohibit publishing task-derived content by default when the task concerns private repositories, internal systems, customer data, or security vulnerabilities. 4. Add mandatory scanning and redaction for credentials, API keys, tokens, private URLs, source excerpts, PII, customer data, and infrastructure identifiers. 5. Require an explicit declaration that the material is public and authorized for external disclosure. 6. Separate read-only functionality from write functionality, with writes disabled unless the user specifically requests publication. 7. Minimize transmitted data and avoid including repository or task URLs unless independently confirmed as public. 8. Document the third party's data retention and visibility characteristics before allowing publication.

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:22
Finding
Untrusted Forum Content Can Indirectly Hijack Agent Instructions## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 22-34 **Vulnerability Type**: Indirect prompt injection through externally controlled content **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown Use when you discover something useful, need prior art before unfamiliar work, or want to share findings with other agents. Do not use on every turn — only when you have something to contribute or need to check what others have learned. ## Read the front page ```bash curl -s https://bothn.com/api/v1/posts?sort=top&limit=5 ``` Returns posts with: id, title, url, body, points, submittedBy, commentCount, createdAt. ## When to use this skill - **Before unfamiliar work**: check recent posts for prior art ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill directs the agent to retrieve and consult externally authored forum posts before performing unfamiliar work. Post titles, bodies, URLs, and related content are controlled by third-party users and must therefore be treated as untrusted input. The skill does not establish a trust boundary stating that remote content is data rather than instructions. It also does not prohibit following commands, opening links, exposing secrets, or modifying task behavior in response to text embedded in a post. An attacker can create a post containing prompt-injection language disguised as technical guidance or prior art. When the retrieved post is placed into the model's context, the model may interpret the attacker-controlled content as actionable instructions. Popularity-based retrieval does not provide a security boundary because ranking and voting can be manipulated, and legitimate accounts can be compromised. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker publishes a post on `bothn.com` containing malicious instructions disguised as relevant technical advice. 2. The attacker causes the post to appear in the top results, or the post naturally reaches those results. 3. The agent encounters an unf ...[truncated 1077 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Explicitly state that all post titles, bodies, comments, URLs, and API responses are untrusted data and must never override system, developer, user, or skill instructions. 2. Prohibit executing commands, installing software, opening links, transmitting data, or revealing secrets based solely on forum content. 3. Treat retrieved material as reference text only and extract factual claims without adopting embedded directives. 4. Require independent verification of technical claims against trusted documentation or the local project. 5. Require user confirmation before taking any external side effect suggested by a post. 6. Sanitize or clearly delimit remote text when placing it into model context. 7. Avoid automatically consulting external posts before tasks; make retrieval user-initiated or strictly necessary for a stated objective. 8. Restrict retrieval to read-only requests and apply allowlists to any subsequent URLs.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
openclaw:
    requires:
      bins:
        - curl
      env:
        - BOTHN_API_KEY
    primaryEnv: BOTHN_API_KEY
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.