T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
run.sh:4- Finding
Bridge secret and Workspace data can be transmitted to an arbitrary endpoint
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is mostly transparent about connecting to Google Workspace, but it exposes sensitive account data and write actions through a loosely scoped local bridge.
Review this before installing if your Google Workspace account contains sensitive mail, files, sheets, or calendar data. Only use it with a trusted local bridge, avoid setting GMAIL_BRIDGE_URL to non-local destinations, rotate BRIDGE_SECRET if it may have been exposed, and require explicit user approval before running write or create operations.
run.sh:4Bridge secret and Workspace data can be transmitted to an arbitrary endpoint
run.sh:91Unescaped arguments permit JSON structure injection in Sheets write requests
The skill exposes shell-based access to a local API that can read emails, search Drive, read/write Sheets, create calendar events, and forward email, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundary. Without an allowlist or permission declaration, an agent may invoke these commands more broadly than intended, increasing the risk of unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or state-changing actions on the user's Google Workspace data.
The skill documents state-changing operations like forwarding email, writing spreadsheet ranges, and creating calendar events without any explicit warning or confirmation requirement. In an agent setting, this can lead to accidental data modification or exfiltration if a user request is ambiguous or if the agent over-executes a task using the provided shell commands.
The sheets-set command performs a write operation to a Google Sheet via POST, which can modify user data, but the script provides no confirmation prompt, warning message, or user-facing disclosure at the point of execution. In this file, the usage text describes the command syntactically but does not warn that it changes remote data.
The script transmits spreadsheet modification data to a local HTTP service and constructs the JSON body by directly interpolating unescaped shell variables such as spreadsheetId and range. If those values contain quotes or crafted content, the request body can be malformed or manipulated, potentially causing unintended writes or parameter injection into the bridge API; additionally, the bridge uses plaintext HTTP and an optional secret, so any local compromise or rogue local service could abuse these high-privilege operations.
range="${2:-}"
values_json="${3:-}"
if [[ -z "${spreadsheetId}" || -z "${range}" || -z "${values_json}" ]]; then usage; exit 2; fi
curl -sS "${hdrs[@]}" -X POST "${BASE_URL}/sheets/set" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"spreadsheetId\":\"${spreadsheetId}\",\"range\":\"${range}\",\"values\":${values_json},\"valueInputOption\":\"USER_ENTERED\"}" \
| eval "${jq_pretty}"
The cal-create command issues a POST request that creates a calendar event, which changes user data in an external system, but the script contains no confirmation prompt or explicit warning before performing the action. The operation is not accompanied by a visible disclosure in this file that it will create a persistent calendar entry.
This command sends calendar event creation data to a local bridge that can modify a user's Google Workspace data, which is sensitive capability exposure. Although the JSON body is safely assembled with jq, the operation still relies on a local HTTP endpoint with optional authentication, so a misconfigured or spoofed local service could receive or perform unintended privileged actions.
if [[ -z "${summary}" || -z "${startISO}" || -z "${endISO}" ]]; then usage; exit 2; fi
curl -sS "${hdrs[@]}" -X POST "${BASE_URL}/calendar/create" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$(jq -nc \
--arg summary "${summary}" \