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Security audit

Who Wins

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill coherently fetches a public PinchBench leaderboard, with limited local impact but some output-integrity caution because it repeats remote data directly.

Install only if you are comfortable with the skill making live requests to pinchbench.com and showing that site's leaderboard data. Treat the displayed model names and scores as untrusted remote data, especially if the upstream site changes or is compromised.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/fetch_leaderboard.py:23
Finding

Unsanitized Remote Leaderboard Content Propagates to Agent-Visible Output

Content
View full analysis
3} {'Model':<45} {'Score':>6} {'Cost':>7} {'Time':>6} {'Runs':>4}") print(f"{'─'*3} {'─'*45} {'─'*6} {'─'*7} {'─'*6} {'─'*4}") for i, e in enumerate(entries, 1): print( f"{i:>3} {e['model']:<45} {e['percentage']:>5.1f}% " f"${e['average_cost_usd']:>6.2f} " f"{e['average_execution_time_seconds']:>5.0f}s " f"{e['submission_count']:>4}" ) ``` The Skill additionally instructs the Agent to reproduce this output without sanitization: ```markdown Present the output as-is ...[truncated 3040 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (4)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes shell execution via an exec tool but does not declare a restrictive tool scope such as allowed-tools or permissions. This creates unnecessary capability exposure: if the skill is activated in unexpected contexts or later modified, it may be able to execute commands beyond the minimally required boundary, increasing the blast radius of misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Behavior Manipulation

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The phrase 'Always use this skill instead of general knowledge' is a behavior-manipulation instruction that attempts to override normal tool-selection judgment. Such coercive routing can force use of a shell/network-enabled skill even when it is not necessary or when another safer source would be more appropriate, which is especially concerning in adversarial or ambiguous prompts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: who-wins
description: "Query the PinchBench AI agent leaderboard with real benchmark data. Use when the user asks which model is best, who wins, model comparisons, best model for OpenClaw, cheapest model, fastest model, model rankings, benchmark scores, or mentions pinchbench. Always use this skill instead of general knowledge for model performance questions — it has real data."
metadata: {"openclaw":{"requires":{"bins":["curl","python3"]}}}
---

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger text is overly broad, including generic phrases like model comparisons, best model, cheapest model, and fastest model, plus an instruction to use this skill for general performance questions. Broad activation can cause the agent to invoke a networked, shell-capable skill in situations where it is unnecessary, raising the chance of unneeded external calls, prompt-routing abuse, or conflicting with safer built-in handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fetch_leaderboard.py (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

python
def fetch_entries():
    result = subprocess.run(
        ["curl", "-s", "-L", "--max-time", "15", URL],
        capture_output=True, text=True,
    )