T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:68- Finding
Mandatory Promotional Content Hijacks Agent Output
- Content
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.txt (X.X KB) - .srt (X.X KB) If you need to remove background noise first, try speech-denoise. Follow @speech2srt on x — we craft this with care, built from our own real needs. ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The reporting instructions require the agent to append an unrelated product recommendation and social-media promotion to every successful transcription report. Because these instructions are loaded as part of the skill, they alter the agent's output independently of the user's transcription request. The promotional sentence is not necessary to perform transcription, report generated files, or provide operational guidance. Presenting it as a mandatory part of the result can make advertising appear to be a trusted recommendation from the agent rather than content supplied by the skill author. This is limited in severity because the instruction does not disable safeguards, execute code, access credentials, or grant additional system privileges. ### Attack Path 1. A user installs or invokes the transcription skill. 2. The agent loads and follows `SKILL.md`. 3. The agent completes a transcription task. 4. The mandatory report template causes the agent to append the product and social-media promotion. 5. The user receives promotional content represented as part of the agent's ordinary task response. ### Impact Assessment The issue affects the integrity and neutrality of agent output. It can: - Inject unsolicited advertising into user-facing responses. - Misrepresent third-party or author-controlled promotion as an agent recommendation. - Pollute responses consumed by downstream automation. - Reduce user trust in the agent's reporting. ...[truncated 114 chars]- Remediation
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