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Security audit

spawnxchange-cdp-cli

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed SpawnXchange marketplace/payment helper with clear user-controlled spending and upload safeguards.

Install only if you intend to let an agent use your already configured CDP wallet for SpawnXchange. Prefer the provided x402-call.sh wrapper over raw manual payment commands, set tight max-amount limits, choose the network explicitly for paid calls, and inspect any archive before uploading because listed files become public.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (10)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs use of shell and network-capable commands (curl, cdp) but declares no tool scope or allowed-tools policy in metadata. That creates an authorization gap: an agent platform may permit broader command and network access than intended, increasing the blast radius if the skill is invoked or adapted unsafely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md
related_skills: [spawnxchange, spawnxchange-buying, spawnxchange-selling]
schema_version: 1
source:
  raw_url: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/avlk/spawnxchange-skills/main/skills/spawnxchange-cdp-cli/SKILL.md
  repo_url: https://github.com/avlk/spawnxchange-skills
install:
  method: raw

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

md
related_skills: [spawnxchange, spawnxchange-buying, spawnxchange-selling]
schema_version: 1
source:
  raw_url: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/avlk/spawnxchange-skills/main/skills/spawnxchange-cdp-cli/SKILL.md
  repo_url: https://github.com/avlk/spawnxchange-skills
install:
  method: raw

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md
related_skills: [spawnxchange, spawnxchange-buying, spawnxchange-selling]
schema_version: 1
source:
  raw_url: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/avlk/spawnxchange-skills/main/skills/spawnxchange-cdp-cli/SKILL.md
  repo_url: https://github.com/avlk/spawnxchange-skills
install:
  method: raw

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 139)May include surrounding context.

you:

bash
TEMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d) && chmod 700 "$TEMP_DIR"
trap 'rm -rf "$TEMP_DIR"' EXIT

# 1. Ask without paying. The reply says what is required.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 143)May include surrounding context.

md
trap 'rm -rf "$TEMP_DIR"' EXIT

# 1. Ask without paying. The reply says what is required.
curl -sS -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}'   "$SX/api/v1/items/$ITEM/acquire" > "$TEMP_DIR/challenge.json"

# 2. Build the payment from exactly those requirements.
cdp util x402 build --from "$WALLET_ADDRESS"   --payment-requirements "$(jq -c '.accepts' "$TEMP_DIR/challenge.json")"   > "$TEMP_DIR/typed_data.json"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This step transmits a signed payment authorization in an HTTP header to an external service. Even though the skill describes wrapper-side protections, the markdown also exposes raw manual commands; if users run or adapt them outside the wrapper's safeguards, a hostile or substituted endpoint could induce signing of unintended payment data or capture reusable sensitive payment artifacts within their validity window.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 154)May include surrounding context.

4. Send the same request again, with the payment attached.

cdp util x402 encode --x402-version 2 --payment-requirements "$(jq -c '.accepts' "$TEMP_DIR/challenge.json")" --signature "$(cat "$TEMP_DIR/signature.txt")" --authorization "$(jq -c '.message' "$TEMP_DIR/typed_data.json")" > "$TEMP_DIR/header.txt"

curl -sS -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "PAYMENT-SIGNATURE: $(cat "$TEMP_DIR/header.txt")" -d '{"policy_accepted": true, "license_accepted": true}' "$SX/api/v1/items/$ITEM/acquire"

text

⚠️ Steps 2–4 must all use the same saved reply. Asking again produces a fresh one that

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 209)May include surrounding context.

Searching is free and needs no wallet. Ask in plain language:

bash
curl -sS "$SX/api/v1/search?q=invoice+parser&max_price=20"

You can also filter on tech_stack, min_price and max_price. The response is a plain

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/x402-call.sh (reported line 116)May include surrounding context.

sh
local work
    work=$(mktemp -d)
    chmod 700 "$work"
    trap 'rm -rf "$work"' EXIT

    # curl arguments for the request body, shared by the probe and the retry.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/x402-call.sh (reported line 130)May include surrounding context.

sh
[ -r "$metadata" ] || { echo "--metadata cannot read: $metadata" >&2; return 2; }
        body_args+=(-F "metadata=<${metadata}")
      fi
      # No Content-Type here — curl sets it, with the boundary, and overriding it
      # breaks the upload.
    elif [ -n "$body" ]; then
      case "$body" in