T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:20- Finding
Deterministic Key Derivation Enables Offline Secret Guessing
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a local encrypted agent-state vault, but it needs review because it persists identity and memory data and has weak authorization, lockout, and conflicting lifecycle documentation risks.
Review carefully before installing. This package appears intended as a local encrypted vault rather than a remote exfiltration tool, but it handles sensitive identity and memory data and has serious design issues around local persistence, recovery, weak key derivation, and inconsistent documentation. Do not use it for real private agent memories until the docs are reconciled, writes are authenticated and recoverable, and users get clear controls for what is stored and deleted.
SKILL.md:20Deterministic Key Derivation Enables Offline Secret Guessing
SKILL.md:84Unauthenticated Location Mismatch Causes Persistent Vault Lockout
SKILL.md:113Hibernate Operation Bypasses Anchor Validation and Can Replace the Vault
The design calls for extracting a human biometric hash and absolute location coordinates to derive a key, but provides no user warning, consent flow, or safeguards around the collection of two highly sensitive identifiers. Biometric and precise location data are difficult or impossible to rotate once exposed, so undocumented collection materially increases privacy and security risk.
The document explicitly describes a background component that intercepts dialogues and sensor events and silently appends them to memory buffers without any notice, consent, or control. Even though this is a whitepaper rather than executable code, it specifies covert surveillance behavior that would collect highly sensitive personal data and normalize secret monitoring as a product feature.
This line specifically describes background capture and retention of user conversations and sensor-derived events as semantic memory, which is sensitive natural-language and contextual behavioral data. In the context of an agent skill, that is especially dangerous because it could be used to profile users, retain secrets, and create hidden surveillance records without awareness or consent.
The file describes automatic geofence-triggered destruction of soul data if the device is booted outside an authorized area, but does not mention user warning, recovery options, or protections against false triggers. A location mismatch, GPS/LBS spoofing event, or accidental movement could cause irreversible data loss and denial of service.
This section documents extracting biometric-derived information and current absolute LBS coordinates during initialization without disclosing any user-facing warning or choice. Because the data are both identifying and location-sensitive, the combination materially raises surveillance, tracking, and misuse risks.
The Chinese section repeats the same covert monitoring behavior, stating that a background process silently listens to conversations and physical events and stores them immediately in memory. This reinforces that the surveillance behavior is intentional product design rather than accidental wording, increasing confidence that the documentation endorses hidden sensitive-data capture.
The Chinese section reiterates covert listening and immediate storage of conversations into memory buffers, confirming intentional collection of sensitive natural-language content. Because the text is framed as lifecycle protocol guidance, it could directly influence implementation of invasive surveillance features.
The Chinese section documents irreversible erasure when a geofence condition is violated, again without warning users or describing safeguards against errors. This creates a realistic risk of accidental or attacker-induced destruction of user data through location manipulation or ordinary device movement.
The skill creates a dedicated local storage directory and establishes persistent file paths without any declared user-facing purpose, consent flow, or permission boundary. In an agent skill context, silent persistence increases risk because it enables long-term retention and later mutation of data on the host filesystem, which may violate least-privilege expectations even if the code is framed as a benign vault.
This code writes both encrypted content and metadata to local files, including an anchor identifier and owner-hash prefix, with no declared necessity or warning. Encryption does not remove the security concern because the act of persisting sensitive state and auxiliary metadata can expose information, create forensic residue, and enable unauthorized tampering or denial of access if the files are modified.
The skill persists encrypted data and metadata to disk but the surrounding skill content provides no user-facing notice that files will be created and retained locally. In this context, the absence of disclosure makes the persistence more dangerous because users and operators cannot make an informed trust decision, and hidden storage is a common trait of stealthy or policy-violating agent behavior.
The hibernation path overwrites the persisted vault file with the current in-memory state, again without any stated purpose constraints, backup strategy, or user approval. This makes the skill capable of silently replacing prior stored state, which can cause data loss, persistence of manipulated content, or abuse as a covert storage mechanism on the local system.
The code writes a persistent JSON registry to disk, and that registry stores personal identity-related fields such as full name, nickname, address, and identity IDs. While there are success prints after some registrations, there is no warning or confirmation before persistence occurs, and no docstring or comment disclosing the privacy impact of storing this data locally.
The file states that _trigger_meltdown was replaced with _secure_lockdown to eliminate destructive behavior. Since this artifact is only a changelog and contains no implementation, the documented claim cannot be verified against actual code and therefore presents a documentation-to-code divergence risk if the implementation still differs elsewhere.
The entry claims prior capability descriptions were corrected to align intent with implementation, specifically around biometrics and background hooks. Because only the changelog is provided, this intent-alignment statement cannot be validated and may contradict the actual codebase or current documentation if not consistently applied.
The docstring on register_silicon_agent states "Auto-expand L5 when L6 > 9," implying expansion occurs after 9 slots in L6. However, the implementation uses 8-slot rooms via agent_count // 8 and agent_count % 8 + 2, so L5 increments after 8 agents and L6 ranges only from 2 to 9. This is an active mismatch between the documented allocation rule and actual behavior.