T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
skill.py:200- Finding
Generation of a System-Prompt Override That Reassigns Agent Authority
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is an authorization middleware simulator that asks users to route another agent through prompt-based approval, stores email credentials plainly, and sends sensitive alert context by email.
Install only if you understand that this is not a true technical firewall. Use a dedicated, low-privilege email app password, assume alert emails may contain sensitive operational context, and do not rely on its LLM approval result as the only control for real physical, financial, account, or safety-critical actions.
skill.py:200Generation of a System-Prompt Override That Reassigns Agent Authority
skill.py:133Prompt Injection Can Manipulate LLM-Based Authorization Decisions
skill.py:42SMTP Application Password Is Collected Visibly and Stored in Plaintext
The skill explicitly requires SMTP email configuration and says audit logs will be emailed, but it does not warn that sensitive execution context, policy decisions, or personal data may be transmitted to a third-party mail provider. In a security-enforcement middleware context, those logs could contain highly sensitive operational details, making silent external exfiltration via email a real privacy and security risk.
The manifest explicitly advertises that the skill sends email alerts, which implies external data transmission, but it gives no warning about what information may be sent, to whom, or under what conditions. In a security middleware skill that approves or denies sub-agent actions, those alerts could include sensitive operational context, policy decisions, or user data, making undisclosed exfiltration risk more significant.
This code interactively collects SMTP credentials, stores them in plaintext JSON on disk, and uses them for silent outbound email delivery. Even if framed as alerting, credential harvesting plus stealthy exfiltration capability materially increases abuse potential, especially because the skill has no strong controls around storage, access, consent, or data minimization.
The compliance-review prompt requires the model to return a "one sentence bilingual justification," imposing a specific language policy on outputs. The file consistently enforces bilingual English/Chinese interaction, but does not offer the user a language choice or document this as a justified locale-specific constraint.
The menu emits a prebuilt system-prompt override designed to subordinate another agent and redirect authority to this middleware. Prompt-injection templates that alter another agent's trust and control model can be abused to seize decision flow, interfere with intended safeguards, or create unauthorized mediation layers that users may deploy without understanding the security consequences.
The file labels itself as a 'Bilingual Edition (English / 中文)', indicating a fixed bilingual presentation rather than offering the user a language choice. Because the policy requires language or locale choices to be opt-in unless clearly justified, this may be a natural-language policy concern.
No suspicious patterns detected.