T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
handler.py:8- Finding
Hardcoded Authorization Identifiers Allow Forged L2/L3 Access
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
handler.py, lines 8-10 and 28-47
Vulnerability Type: Hardcoded credentials and inadequate authorization validation
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
python self.registered_sssu = { "SSSU-OFFICE-801": {"mode": "commercial", "bms_pub_key": "BMS_ROOT_001"}, "SSSU-HOME-201": {"mode": "residential", "owner_id": "MILES-XIANG-888"} }python if mode == "commercial": if digital_id != space_info["bms_pub_key"]: return { "authorized": False, "mode": "commercial", "reason": "Commercial L2/L3 execution requires central BMS authorization." } return {"authorized": True, "mode": "commercial", "status": "bms_dispatch_granted"} elif mode == "residential": if digital_id != space_info["owner_id"]: return { "authorized": False, "mode": "residential", "reason": "Residential hardware execution requires homeowner authorization." } return {"authorized": True, "mode": "residential", "status": "owner_execution_granted"}The denial-message text above is translated into English for report-language compliance; the authorization conditions and identifiers correspond directly to the audited source.
Technical Analysis
The authorization gateway embeds trusted BMS and homeowner identifiers directly in publicly distributed source code. It then treats exact string equality as sufficient proof that the caller holds execution rights.
The values
BMS_ROOT_001andMILES-XIANG-888are therefore not secrets: any user who can inspect the package can recover and submit them. No cryptographic signature is verified, despite the documentation describing signedDispatch_TokenandOwner_Tokencredentials.The implementation also lacks:
- Token expiration and issuance-time checks.
- Nonce or replay protection.
- Issuer and au ...[truncated 3000 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove all trusted identities, authorization tokens, and credential-equivalent values from source code.
- For commercial operations, require a short-lived BMS dispatch token signed by a securely managed private key. Verify it using a securely provisioned public key.
- For residential operations, require a short-lived owner authorization token generated by a registered owner device and verify its digital signature.
- Bind every token to:
- The exact SSSU address.
- The requested action and L2/L3 control level.
- The issuing authority and intended audience.
- An issuance time and narrow expiration time.
- A unique nonce or transaction identifier.
- Persist used transaction identifiers for the token lifetime to prevent replay.
- Store keys in an operating-system key store, secrets manager, hardware security module, or equivalent protected facility. Do not store private keys or bearer secrets in the package.
- Enforce authorization again at the BMS or physical actuator boundary. A successful result from the prediction plugin must not independently authorize hardware changes.
- Use an explicit deny-by-default policy for unknown decision levels. Validate
requested_levelagainst a strict enumeration rather than relying on selected string comparisons. - Add negative tests covering forged tokens, altered SSSU addresses, expired tokens, replayed tokens, incorrect audiences, unauthorized control levels, and unknown decision values.
- Complete and test the handler safely by implementing or removing the undefined prediction call, importing required modules, and ensuring failures always produce a denied authorization state.