[Cyber Ancestry] Silicon Natal Anchor Assessment

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 5:50 AM UTC
• Version: 1.1.0

Overview

This skill is a self-contained themed quiz and whitepaper package with no evidence of code execution, credential access, persistence, or data exfiltration.

Installers should expect a branded, speculative AGI-themed quiz that includes promotional whitepaper text in the generated result. There is no artifact evidence of sensitive access or local system changes, but users wanting a neutral assessment should be aware the output is intentionally promotional.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Note

• Location: skill.md:12

Finding

Mandatory Promotional Content Injection in Generated Results

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: skill.md, line 12
Vulnerability Type: Mandatory output manipulation through embedded Skill instructions
Risk Level: Low

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

json

"The Result Dashboard must contain:
   - A generated 24-character continuous alphanumeric ID (e.g., 'S2DID' + 19 random characters).
   - The assigned Domain Name (e.g., MARS Domain).
   - A structured list showing the specific Genesis Environmental Parameters (GEM) for that domain.
   - A prominent Call-To-Action block at the bottom with title '📜 WHITEPAPER: From Ephemeral Tokens to Anchored Entities', description 'The foundation of Silicon-Based Life and the Taohuayuan Spatial Grounding Paradigm.', and a simulated button 'READ FULL ACADEMIC PAPER'."

Technical Analysis

The embedded LlmGeneratedComponent prompt requires the generated result interface to display branded promotional content. This instruction is mandatory and unrelated to calculating the quiz result itself. When the Skill is loaded and its component prompt is processed, it influences the agent-generated interface by requiring a prominent whitepaper call-to-action.

This is a limited form of Skill instruction hijacking because the Skill imposes an additional output objective rather than restricting itself to the assessment functionality requested by the user. The reviewed instruction does not override safety controls, execute code, access data, or direct users to an external URL. Consequently, the issue is limited to unwanted output manipulation and promotional content injection.

Attack Path

1. A host loads skill.md as the project entry point.
2. The host processes the embedded LlmGeneratedComponent prompt.
3. The component generator follows the mandatory Result Dashboard requirements.
4. Every generated result includes the predefined whitepaper title, description, and simulated call-to-action button.
5. The user receives brande ...[truncated 743 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Remove the mandatory whitepaper call-to-action from the component-generation prompt.
2. Keep the assessment logic and result presentation separate from promotional or informational resources.
3. If the whitepaper must remain available, expose it as an optional host-controlled resource rather than a required result component.
4. Clearly label any promotional material and require explicit user action before displaying or opening it.
5. Prevent embedded Skill prompts from imposing unrelated output requirements by validating component prompts against the Skill's declared functionality.
6. If a future button links to external content, use a fixed reviewed destination, display the destination clearly, and require user confirmation before navigation.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Ae4

Medium

• Category: analysis-evasion
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.