T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:8- Finding
Hard-Coded Bearer Token Exposes Privileged Android Component Proxy
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a local Android control proxy whose purpose is clear, but it exposes a hardcoded bearer token and gives broad authority over app components and ContentProviders.
Review this carefully before installing. Only use it with a token generated for your own device, rotate the exposed token, and restrict use to trusted agents and explicit targets. Avoid broad ContentProvider operations unless you know exactly what data may be read, changed, or deleted.
SKILL.md:8Hard-Coded Bearer Token Exposes Privileged Android Component Proxy
The skill manifest contains a concrete bearer token directly in configuration, which exposes a reusable secret to anyone who can read, copy, or package the skill. Because this token authorizes a local API that can start activities/services, send broadcasts, and read or modify ContentProviders, disclosure enables unauthorized control over sensitive device-app interactions.
The documentation presents activity launches, service starts, and broadcast sending as routine actions without warning that they can change system/app behavior, trigger privileged flows, or interact with exported components in unsafe ways. Given that the skill is specifically designed to proxy Android component invocation when direct intent execution is unavailable, missing warnings materially increase the risk of misuse.
These sections advertise provider query/insert/update/delete/call capabilities without warning that they may read private app data or alter/delete device state. In this skill's context, the omission is significant because the tool is explicitly a proxy for invoking privileged Android component operations that can have immediate security and privacy consequences.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8726/api/v1/component/<endpoint> \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '<json_body>'
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
场景:启动录音应用的透明 Activity 进行录音控制
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8726/api/v1/component/activity/start \
-H "Authorization: Bearer a3f8xxxxxxxxxxc9d2" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{