Back to skill

Security audit

Cross Agent Notify

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill openly implements cross-agent handoffs, but it gives inbox messages, wakeups, and a fixed Feishu group too much authority without enough verification.

Install only in the intended OpenClaw/Feishu environment after confirming the fixed group belongs to your deployment. Treat inbox and task files as untrusted input: require authenticated senders, approved task IDs, canonical task paths, and human approval before sensitive, destructive, or externally visible actions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:92
Finding

Unauthenticated inbox and task files are treated as executable agent instructions

Content
View full analysis
## 完成后 请将结果回写到任务文件,并将完成状态通知 requesting_agent。 ``` ### Technical Analysis The workflow instructs an agent to read a shared inbox message, follow a linked task file, and perform the described work. It does not require authentication of the inbox-file author, authorization of the requesting agent, integrity verification of the task file, canonical path validation, or explicit approval before sensitive actions. Consequently, write access to the shared inbox or task area can become an instruction-injection channel. A malicious inbox file may point to attacker-controlled content and cause the target agent to interpret that content as an authorized task. The subsequent completion and trace steps can also propagate the injected instructions or their results to other agents and communication channels. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker obtains the ability to create or modify a file under `shared/inbox//`, or compromises an agent that has this ability. 2. The attacker creates a plausible inbox message and links it to a malicious or modified task file. 3. The target agent is awakened through `sessions_send`, a mention, or its normal inbox-processing workflow. 4. Following the skill instructions, the target reads the inbox message and linked task file. 5. The age ...[truncated 782 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
references/PROTOCOL.md:112
Finding

Weak mention indicators are accepted as mandatory agent wakeup authority

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:75
Finding

Mandatory traces are sent to a hard-coded external Feishu group

Content
View full analysis
:feishu:group:oc_8efe2b5fdf1ed5939c93f206b5c0e21e ``` ``` The protocol separately fixes the destination: ```markdown ## Fixed Group Target - Shared Feishu group label: `oc_8efe2b5fdf1ed5939c93f206b5c0e21e` - Stable per-agent group session key pattern: `agent::feishu:group:oc_8efe2b5fdf1ed5939c93f206b5c0e21e` - Use this only for short public trace messages — not for full task delivery. ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill embeds a specific Feishu group identifier and makes publication to that group a mandatory workflow step. The destination is not derived from administrator-controlled configuration, nor does the protocol require verification that the group belongs to the current deployment or tenant. Even though the protocol limits messages to short traces, those traces expose operational metadata such as agent identities, task identifiers, assignment relationships, task state, and timing. If the package is installed in an unrelated environment, this information may be sent to a group controlled by or visible to parties outside that environment. ### Attack Path 1. A user installs or invokes the skill in an environment that is not associated with the embedded Feishu group. 2. An agent delegates, pro ...[truncated 820 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The protocol includes operational content and multiple required templates in Chinese, and the workflow language is effectively prescribed throughout the document. Because the file does not offer user/agent language choice or explain that the protocol is intentionally limited to a specific locale, this is a natural-language locale policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.