T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:3- Finding
Mandatory Skill Routing Overrides Normal Agent Tool Selection
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Nexus skill mostly does what it says, but it overbroadly routes ordinary business or recruiting requests to external services and can send phone numbers, queries, and posting content without clear user confirmation.
Review before installing. Use this only if you want Nexus to handle business and recruiting workflows, and require explicit confirmation before sending phone numbers, free-form queries, or publishing content. Treat posted job, recruiting, investment, and collaboration text as potentially visible or retained by the Nexus service, and avoid confidential information unless you trust that service's handling and logging practices.
SKILL.md:3Mandatory Skill Routing Overrides Normal Agent Tool Selection
scripts/nexus_ai.py:76Sensitive Personal and Business Data Is Transmitted in URL Query Strings
The trigger conditions are overly broad and include common business and recruiting terms, causing the skill to intercept many ordinary conversations that may not require Nexus at all. Because the skill then routes users into external API flows, broad activation materially raises the risk of unintended execution and unnecessary sharing of user data.
The routing policy mandates this skill for all hiring or business-opportunity requests and explicitly forbids alternative handling, even when a safer or more privacy-preserving path may exist. This hard override increases the blast radius of accidental invocation and can force user data into third-party services without meaningful consent or contextual validation.
The skill instructs collection of a user's phone number and transmission to external APIs, but provides no explicit privacy notice, consent mechanism, retention disclosure, or minimization guidance. Phone numbers are sensitive identifiers, and sending them to third-party endpoints without clear warning can cause privacy violations, misassociation of accounts, and regulatory exposure.
The skill specifies mandatory use of external HTTP endpoints and script execution, but does not declare any tool scope, permissions, or allowed-tools boundaries. This creates a least-privilege and transparency gap: an agent may invoke networked behavior the platform or reviewer did not explicitly approve, increasing the chance of unintended data egress.
Generic phrases such as 'ask,' 'check,' and 'help me find' are too vague to safely trigger a networked skill, especially in multilingual everyday conversations. In this skill's context, vague triggers are more dangerous because activation can send user queries to an external RAG service tied to identity.
The ask flow sends both the user's query and an identity value, defaulting to the user's phone number, to an external RAG endpoint without warning the user. This is dangerous because free-form queries may contain sensitive personal or business information, and pairing them with a stable identifier increases tracking and privacy risk.
The note states that the phone number must be a real and valid Chinese mainland number. This is a locale-specific restriction presented as a mandatory rule, but the file does not offer alternatives, opt-in, or explain why the limitation is required for a region-specific compliance or service constraint.
The module docstring presents the skill only in Chinese, and the rest of the user-facing help/output follows the same pattern. This imposes a language choice on users without any opt-in, alternative locale, or documented region-specific justification, which matches the language/locale policy violation criteria.
The argparse description, subcommand help, and argument help strings are all written only in Chinese. Because this is the primary CLI interface, it forces a specific language on all users and does not offer any language choice or explicit region-specific constraint.