Tool Parameter Abuse
- Category
- Tool Misuse
- Confidence
- 60% confidence
- Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
- Content
md ` is an open-ended entry point.** Any authenticated caller can send **arbitrary prompts** to the agent, which then decides which Skills to run — including side-effecting ones (send messages, modify data). Keep the port reachable only by trusted callers. - **HTTP is the default and is unencrypted.** By default the `X-API-Key`, prompts, and results travel in **cleartext**. Acceptable only on `localhost` / a trusted network; enable HTTPS when binding `0.0.0.0` or calling cross-host, and never use `curl -k` (skip cert verification) in production. - **It modifies global config.** init / watchdog write and self-heal the hooks config in `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json` (and optionally sync to external sources via `OPENCLAW_CONFIG_SYNC_PATHS`). This is a platform-level change; the watchdog may re-apply it after a manual revert — be aware of this persistence behavior. - **Protect the API Key.** It is a bearer credential — leaking it grants agent-invocation rights. Keep it out of shell history, logs,
