Ae1
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md Read the skill's `SKILL.md` and all supporting files.
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a coherent skill-improvement helper, but it can inspect projects and modify other skills' agent instructions with broad triggers and limited scoping safeguards.
Install only if you want a meta-skill that can inspect your project and other skills, and use it with explicit target skill names. Before allowing it to apply improvements, require a visible diff, confirm the exact skill directory being changed, and keep a rollback path for SKILL.md and supporting files.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
Read the skill's `SKILL.md` and all supporting files.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
Read the skill's `SKILL.md` and all supporting files.
The main invocation guidance uses broad phrases like improving a skill after friction or when it "doesn't handle Y," without strong constraints on scope, target resolution, or confirmation. That ambiguity can lead to the wrong skill being selected or the meta-skill running in situations where the user only intended conversational feedback, creating unnecessary access to project and skill internals.
The skill is presented as an evaluator/recommender, but it also authorizes itself to modify another skill and its supporting files after user approval. That expands it from analysis into a code-changing meta-skill, increasing the chance of unsafe or unintended prompt-driven edits to reusable agent behavior, especially if the target skill is security-sensitive or widely shared.
The auto-invocation triggers are broad enough to fire on ordinary user dissatisfaction or casual feedback, which can cause the agent to enter a high-privilege meta-analysis/editing flow without a clearly scoped request. In context, this is more dangerous because the skill can later edit other skills, so loose triggering increases the chance of unintended or manipulative activation.
The principle at L177 emphasizes staying within the skill's stated purpose, implying a constrained advisory role. Yet L156-L160 instruct the agent to make concrete edits to the skill definition and supporting files, which creates an intent-level contradiction between advisory restraint and direct implementation activity.
No suspicious patterns detected.