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Security audit

GoDaddy API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only GoDaddy workflow skill that clearly discloses account-changing actions and requires user approval for purchases, DNS changes, and other mutations.

Before installing, be comfortable that this skill is meant to help an agent manage real GoDaddy resources. Do not approve purchases, DNS edits, hosting changes, email provisioning, or API mutations unless the agent shows the exact target, effect, cost, and rollback or verification plan. Prefer the checksum-verified gddy release path; if using the optional npx agent installer, review the package/version and run it with normal user privileges.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
references/agent-platform.md:19
Finding
Unpinned Package Execution in Optional Agent Integration## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `references/agent-platform.md`, lines 19–23 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party package execution **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable Code Snippet**: ```markdown The official CLI skill can also be installed for a supported agent: ```bash npx skills add godaddy/cli --skill gddy --agent <agent> ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented `npx skills` command may retrieve and execute the current version of the unpinned `skills` package from the npm registry. The command does not specify an exact package version, integrity hash, lockfile, or provenance-verification procedure. Consequently, the code executed when a user follows this instruction can change after the skill has been audited. Trusting the `godaddy/cli` source repository does not independently establish the integrity of the npm launcher that downloads and installs it. This creates a supply-chain exposure if the package, a maintainer account, its dependencies, or the registry delivery path is compromised. The installation is described as optional, and the document advises users to inspect installer help before changing host configuration. These precautions reduce accidental configuration risk but do not resolve the unpinned executable dependency. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the npm package, a publishing account, or a transitive dependency associated with the `skills` launcher. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release while retaining the expected package name. 3. A user or agent follows the documented unversioned `npx skills add ...` command. 4. `npx` resolves and downloads the mutable package version available at execution time. 5. Malicious launcher, dependency, or lifecycle code executes with the permissions of the invoking user. 6. The payload can access resources available to that user and may alter the agent’s local configuration. ### Impact Assessment Successful ex ...[truncated 562 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the launcher to an exact, reviewed package version rather than relying on the registry’s current version. 2. Record and verify the package integrity digest and npm provenance before execution. 3. Review and pin relevant transitive dependencies through an appropriate lockfile or reproducible installation mechanism. 4. Prefer a checksum-verified release artifact or an official installer whose immutable source and integrity can be independently validated. 5. Run the installer with ordinary user privileges in a constrained environment, never from an elevated shell unless strictly required. 6. Document the files and agent settings the installer is expected to modify, then require users to review those changes before approval. 7. Re-audit the pinned release before updating the documented version.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
gddy auth login --scope <scope>
```

Let `gddy` open the browser when login or additional consent is required. Never ask the user to paste an OAuth token into chat.

For non-interactive automation, use a scoped PAT only when the operation supports it. Generate it at <https://developer.godaddy.com/en/personal-access-token>, then store it with `gddy pat add` or supply it through `GDDY_PAT`. Never print, log, commit, or package credentials. Legacy `sso-key` credentials do not work with Domains v3 and are deprecated.
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "godaddy": {
      "url": "https://api.godaddy.com/v1/domains/mcp",
      "transport": "streamable-http"
    }
  }
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "godaddy": {
      "url": "https://api.godaddy.com/v1/domains/mcp",
      "transport": "streamable-http"
    }
  }
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.