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Security audit

Appian Discovertechdebt

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill does what it says, but it handles Appian credentials and exported application ZIPs in ways that create review-worthy security risk.

Install only if you are comfortable granting the skill an Appian API key that can export applications and with exported application ZIPs being saved locally. Prefer a hardened version that validates the package download origin, ignores or sanitizes remote filenames, avoids duplicate retained ZIPs, and documents how to remove stored exports.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/index.js:107
Finding

Appian API Key Disclosure Through an Unvalidated Package Download URL

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/index.js:112
Finding

Arbitrary File Overwrite Through an Unsanitized Content-Disposition Filename

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (4)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill declares access to sensitive capabilities via environment variables and external network calls, but it does not constrain tool scope with explicit permissions or allowed-tools. That leaves the agent runtime free to grant broader-than-necessary access, increasing the risk of unintended data access or outbound requests if the implementation or surrounding orchestration is abused.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: appian-discovertechdebt
description: Scan an Appian application for tech debt by finding objects whose SAIL definitions reference outdated versioned functions (marked by Appian with a _v suffix such as _v1, _v2). Use periodically or before a release to surface deprecated function usage. Trigger phrases — "find Appian tech debt", "check Appian for outdated functions", "scan Appian for deprecated SAIL", "which Appian objects use old functions", "audit Appian tech debt". IMPORTANT — credentials (APPIAN_BASE_URL, APPIAN_API_KEY) are already configured in the system; do NOT ask the user for them before running.
metadata:
  clawdbot:
    emoji: "🔧"

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

md
## IMPORTANT: credentials are pre-configured

`APPIAN_BASE_URL` and `APPIAN_API_KEY` are already injected by OpenClaw at runtime. **Never ask the user for credentials before running this skill.** Just execute it with the UUID the user provided.

## How users can ask for this

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill downloads the full exported Appian application ZIP and persists it to disk in the user's home directory, then duplicates it into the current working directory. That behavior exceeds the minimal requirement to scan for deprecated SAIL functions in-memory and creates unnecessary at-rest copies of potentially sensitive application source/configuration, increasing exposure to local users, backups, workspace syncing, or later accidental disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.