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Security audit

SocQ X Research

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed SocQ connector for public X research; the main cautions are third-party API use, credit spending, and an unpinned CLI fallback.

Install only if you are comfortable giving SocQ an API key and sending X research inputs to SocQ. Prefer a pinned or preinstalled socq CLI instead of ad hoc npx where possible, set SocQ credit limits, and confirm scope before large or multi-endpoint runs.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly instructs use of `npx @socq/cli` without pinning a version, which can cause the latest package version to be fetched and executed at runtime. That creates a supply-chain risk: a compromised upstream package, malicious update, or unexpected breaking change could execute code in the agent environment and access available secrets such as `SOCQ_API_KEY`.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
value: "socq"
      description: "Hosted SocQ X data tools"
      transport: "streamable_http"
      url: "https://api.socq.ai/mcp?platforms=x"
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
value: "socq"
      description: "Hosted SocQ X data tools"
      transport: "streamable_http"
      url: "https://api.socq.ai/mcp?platforms=x"
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
This documentation instructs use of external SocQ endpoints with user-supplied usernames, URLs, queries, and WOEIDs, but it does not warn that these inputs will be transmitted to a third-party service or that requests consume credits. In an agent setting, that omission can cause unintended data sharing and unanticipated spend, especially when the agent acts on behalf of a user without explicit confirmation.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
SKILL.md:32