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Security audit

SocQ Amazon Research

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill coherently connects an agent to SocQ for public Amazon research, with disclosed external API use and reasonable guardrails around credentials, billing, and scope.

Install this only if you are comfortable using SocQ as a third-party service for public Amazon research. Set SOCQ_API_KEY securely, avoid placing secrets or private business data in prompts or URLs, confirm paid or large collection jobs before running them, and prefer a pinned or already-installed SocQ CLI where your environment requires tighter supply-chain control.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly recommends `npx @socq/cli` without a pinned version. Unpinned `npx` execution can fetch and run the latest published package, creating supply-chain risk if the package is compromised or a breaking/malicious release is published.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The default prompt and short description broadly instruct an agent to 'collect and analyze' Amazon research requests without embedding clear scope limits, approval requirements, or data-handling constraints. In a skill that can call an external hosted MCP service, this ambiguity can cause overbroad collection, unintended transmission of user-supplied data, or use outside the intended 'public Amazon content' scope.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
value: "socq"
      description: "Hosted SocQ Amazon data tools"
      transport: "streamable_http"
      url: "https://api.socq.ai/mcp?platforms=amazon"
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill is configured to send requests to an external hosted endpoint at api.socq.ai over streamable HTTP, which creates a real data egress path. Even if the service is legitimate, any user prompts, query terms, account identifiers, or exported results provided through the skill may be transmitted off-platform, making this risky unless users are clearly informed and inputs are tightly scoped.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
value: "socq"
      description: "Hosted SocQ Amazon data tools"
      transport: "streamable_http"
      url: "https://api.socq.ai/mcp?platforms=amazon"
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill is configured to send requests to an external hosted endpoint at api.socq.ai over streamable HTTP, which creates a real data egress path. Even if the service is legitimate, any user prompts, query terms, account identifiers, or exported results provided through the skill may be transmitted off-platform, making this risky unless users are clearly informed and inputs are tightly scoped.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
SKILL.md:32