ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

SocQ Amazon Research

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent Amazon public-data research skill that uses SocQ’s external service and API key, with some install and data-sharing cautions but no hidden or destructive behavior found.

Install only if you are comfortable sending Amazon research inputs to SocQ and using a SOCQ_API_KEY for billable requests. Prefer a vetted or pinned @socq/cli version instead of ad hoc npx use when operating in a sensitive environment, and set credit limits or require confirmation for larger collections.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

md
## Execution

1. Prefer an already configured SocQ MCP server at `https://api.socq.ai/mcp?platforms=amazon`; use the typed tool listed in [platform.md](references/platform.md), or compact `socq_execute` when needed.
2. If MCP is unavailable, use `socq` or `npx @socq/cli`. Use REST only as the final fallback.
3. Read [authentication.md](references/authentication.md), keep `SOCQ_API_KEY` in the environment, and never put it in prompts, URLs, committed files, or retained commands.
4. Read [billing.md](references/billing.md), report the expected cost, and obtain confirmation before a paid large-volume or multi-endpoint run.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs use of npx @socq/cli without pinning an exact version, which can fetch and execute whatever version is currently published. That creates supply-chain and reproducibility risk: a malicious or compromised upstream release could run arbitrary code in the agent environment and access sensitive data such as SOCQ_API_KEY.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The default prompt activates the skill for any request to 'collect and analyze this public Amazon research request' without clear scope, authorization, or sensitivity boundaries. Broad invocation language increases the chance an agent will route loosely related or risky requests to an external research tool, which can lead to unnecessary third-party data transmission or misuse of collection capabilities.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This skill is configured to send requests to an external hosted MCP endpoint at api.socq.ai over HTTP-based transport. That creates a real data egress path: prompts, search terms, account identifiers, and research targets may be transmitted to a third party, which is significant because the skill is designed for discovery, collection, exports, and asynchronous task execution.

Content

Scanner excerpt · agents/openai.yaml (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

yaml
value: "socq"
      description: "Hosted SocQ Amazon data tools"
      transport: "streamable_http"
      url: "https://api.socq.ai/mcp?platforms=amazon"

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The documentation instructs agents to use external Amazon-related SocQ endpoints with user-supplied URLs and queries, and it lists per-result costs, but it does not clearly warn that inputs are transmitted to a third-party service or require explicit user/operator awareness for billing-sensitive actions. In an agent skill, this omission can lead to unintended disclosure of user-provided research targets and surprise credit consumption through normal use rather than an overt exploit.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
SKILL.md:32