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Security audit

Autonomous Agent

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is not clearly malicious, but it asks for trust in broad autonomous monitoring while some safety and control claims are under-scoped or nonfunctional.

Review before installing. Use only in a tightly scoped, assisted mode unless you are prepared to restrict filesystem access, disable broad log scanning, and treat the autonomy, rollback, permission, and safety claims as unproven until the implementation is fixed and tested.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
scripts/state_awareness.py:81
Finding

Overbroad Host Reconnaissance and Log Collection

Content
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Dict[str, float]: """Get current system resource usage metrics.""" try: cpu_percent = psutil.cpu_percent(interval=1) memory = psutil.virtual_memory() disk = psutil.disk_usage('/') return { 'cpu_percent': cpu_percent, 'memory_percent': memory.percent, 'memory_available_gb': memory.available / (1024**3), 'disk_percent': disk.percent, 'disk_free_gb': disk.free / (1024**3), 'process_count': len(psutil.pids()) } except Exception as e: print(f"Error getting resource metrics: {e}") return { 'cpu_percent': 0, 'memory_percent': 0, 'memory_available_gb': 0, 'disk_percent': 0, 'disk_free_gb': 0, 'process_count': 0 } def _get_recent_errors(self, hours: int = 24) -> List[Dict]: """Get recent system errors from logs.""" errors = [] cutoff_time = datetime.now() - timedelta(hours=hours) # Look for error logs in common locations log_locations = [ "os.path.expanduser('~/.claude/logs')", "/var/log", "./logs" ] for log_dir in log_locations: if os.path.exists(log_dir): try: for log_file in os.listdir(log_dir): if log_file.endswith('.log'): file_path = os.path.join(log_dir, log_file) file_errors = self._parse_error_log(file_path, cutoff_time) errors.extend(file_errors) except Exception as e: print(f"Error reading log directory {log_dir}: {e}") return errors def _parse_error_log(self, f ...[truncated 2989 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/resilient_executor.py:186
Finding

Timeout Mechanism Does Not Interrupt or Constrain Task Execution

Content
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ExecutionResult: """Execute task with retry strategy based on error type.""" retry_count = 0 last_error = None last_error_type = None while retry_count <= context.max_retries: try: # Update execution status with self.execution_lock: if context.task_id in self.active_executions: self.active_executions[context.task_id]['status'] = ExecutionStatus.RUNNING # Execute the task start_time = time.time() result = self._execute_task_with_timeout(task_func, context, **kwargs) execution_time = time.time() - start_time # Success - record and return execution_result = ExecutionResult( task_id=context.task_id, status=ExecutionStatus.COMPLETED, result=result, execution_time=execution_time, retry_count=retry_count, metadata={'success': True} ) self._record_success(context, execution_result) return execution_result except Exception as e: execution_time = time.time() - start_time if 'start_time' in locals() else 0 error_type = self._classify_error(e) last_error = str(e) last_error_type = error_type # Check if we should retry if not self._should_retry(error_type, retry_count, context.max_retries): break # Apply recovery actions recovery_actions = self._apply_recovery_actions(error_type, context) # Calculate delay before retr ...[truncated 3190 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/autonomous_agent.py:14
Finding

Advertised Autonomous Safety Pipeline Is Nonfunctional Due to API Mismatches

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (40)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

If the underlying behavior is only rule-based uncertainty assessment and escalation, calling it a broad autonomous framework overstates both capability and safety posture. The main security risk is misplaced trust leading to deployment in contexts where users expect richer oversight, adaptation, or containment than actually exists.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/event_listener.py (reported line 336)May include surrounding context.

python
"""Setup default paths to monitor."""
        default_paths = [
            "os.path.expanduser('~/.claude/skills')",
            "os.path.expanduser('~/.claude/config')",
            "os.path.expanduser('~/.claude/memory')"
        ]

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises monitoring, task execution, external API connectivity, and learning behavior, which implies access to filesystem, write, and network capabilities, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. In an agent ecosystem, missing scope declarations can cause overbroad access or ambiguous enforcement, making it harder to review and safely contain autonomous behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The description is broad enough to match common requests about autonomous or adaptive AI systems, which can cause the skill to be selected in situations beyond its safe or intended scope. For a skill claiming monitoring, learning, and independent operation, overly broad invocation increases the risk of accidental activation in sensitive contexts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The markdown promotes autonomous monitoring, learning from user preferences, and external API connections without prominent privacy, consent, retention, and system-impact warnings. In practice, that can normalize surveillance-like behavior and outbound data flows without users understanding what is collected, stored, or transmitted.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The agent starts heartbeat and event monitoring immediately when start() is called, but the file shows no user-facing notice, consent flow, or clear indication that system/activity data will be observed. In an autonomous-agent skill, silent monitoring is more dangerous because the framework is explicitly designed for continuous perception and state awareness, which can collect sensitive operational or user activity data without informed approval.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The user activity monitor collects session timing, interaction counts, and arbitrary interaction details without any built-in notice, consent, minimization, or retention controls. In an autonomous-agent skill context, this creates privacy risk because behavioral telemetry can expose sensitive usage patterns and potentially user-provided content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The method docstring says it sets up default paths to monitor, and the listed values appear intended to reference ~/.claude directories. However, the entries are quoted string literals containing the text "os.path.expanduser(...)" rather than actual expanded filesystem paths, so os.path.exists(path) will fail and those directories will not be watched.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The listener automatically sets up monitoring for paths under the user's home directory, including Claude skills, config, and memory locations. Although the code has internal comments and docstrings, it does not provide a user-facing warning that these files and directories may be monitored for changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The memory manager accepts and retains arbitrary experience content and metadata, including potentially sensitive user or operational data, without any consent mechanism, data-classification guardrails, or retention warning. In an autonomous-agent context, this is more dangerous because the system is explicitly designed to accumulate reflective and long-term memory, which can silently preserve secrets, personal data, or sensitive workflow details beyond user expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/package_skill.py (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

python
def package_skill():
    """Package the autonomous-agent skill."""

    skill_dir = "os.path.expanduser('~/.claude/skills/autonomous-agent')"
    output_file = "autonomous-agent.skill"

    print("Packaging autonomous-agent skill...")