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Security audit

Video to Shorts Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The video workflow is coherent, but its API-key fallback and unrestricted upload destinations warrant review before use.

Prefer OAuth instead of placing an API key in a URL. Use original upload-session responses and restrict uploads to HTTPS on the documented WoopSocial storage hosts. Choose local transcription for private recordings, and review every posting plan before approving it.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
Findings (22)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 96, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.py (reported line 99)May include surrounding context.

python
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=bytes(body), method="POST", headers={
        "Authorization": f"Bearer {key}", "Content-Type": f"multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}"})
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=600) as r:
            return json.loads(r.read())
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        sys.exit(f"Transcription API error {e.code}: {e.read().decode(errors='replace')[:400]}")

Context Leakage

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 143)May include surrounding context.

md
1. **Check the connection** with `social_accounts_list`. Not connected: give the one connect
   path for the agent you're running in (free plan: 2 social accounts), then
   `oauth_create_authorization` per platform.
2. **Upload each clip** with an upload session (`media_uploads_create_session` with the byte size
   from `shorts/manifest.json`, `python3 scripts/upload_parts.py session.json shorts/clip-01.mp4`,
   `media_uploads_complete_session`). Clips over 10 MB upload in several parts; the script
   handles that.

Context Leakage

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/upload_parts.py (reported line 2)May include surrounding context.

python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Upload one file to a WoopSocial media upload session (standard library only).

WoopSocial uploads work in three steps:
  1. The agent calls `media_uploads_create_session` with the projectId and the file size in bytes.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, mcp, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/woopsocial.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

md
|---|---|
| Claude (claude.ai, Desktop, Cowork) | Add WoopSocial from the [Claude directory](https://claude.ai/directory/woopsocial), click Connect and sign in |
| Cursor | Install from [cursor.directory](https://cursor.directory/plugins/woopsocial-social-media-scheduler) and sign in |
| Claude Code | `claude mcp add --transport http woopsocial "https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp"`, then `/mcp`, select woopsocial, Authenticate |
| Codex | `codex mcp add woopsocial --url https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp`, then `codex mcp login woopsocial` |
| OpenClaw | Install the [WoopSocial skill on ClawHub](https://clawhub.ai/woopsocial/skills/social-media-scheduler), or add the MCP URL to the agent's MCP config |
| Agents without sign-in support | Create an API key at [app.woopsocial.com/api-access](https://app.woopsocial.com/api-access) and use `https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp?api_key=%2A%2A%2A |

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/woopsocial.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

md
| Claude (claude.ai, Desktop, Cowork) | Add WoopSocial from the [Claude directory](https://claude.ai/directory/woopsocial), click Connect and sign in |
| Cursor | Install from [cursor.directory](https://cursor.directory/plugins/woopsocial-social-media-scheduler) and sign in |
| Claude Code | `claude mcp add --transport http woopsocial "https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp"`, then `/mcp`, select woopsocial, Authenticate |
| Codex | `codex mcp add woopsocial --url https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp`, then `codex mcp login woopsocial` |
| OpenClaw | Install the [WoopSocial skill on ClawHub](https://clawhub.ai/woopsocial/skills/social-media-scheduler), or add the MCP URL to the agent's MCP config |
| Agents without sign-in support | Create an API key at [app.woopsocial.com/api-access](https://app.woopsocial.com/api-access) and use `https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp?api_key=%2A%2A%2A |

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The fallback instructs users to place a password-equivalent API key in a URL query string. That URL can persist in MCP configuration, request logs, diagnostics, or copied setup material, exposing access to the user's posting service despite the warning against sharing keys.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/woopsocial.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

md
| Claude Code | `claude mcp add --transport http woopsocial "https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp"`, then `/mcp`, select woopsocial, Authenticate |
| Codex | `codex mcp add woopsocial --url https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp`, then `codex mcp login woopsocial` |
| OpenClaw | Install the [WoopSocial skill on ClawHub](https://clawhub.ai/woopsocial/skills/social-media-scheduler), or add the MCP URL to the agent's MCP config |
| Agents without sign-in support | Create an API key at [app.woopsocial.com/api-access](https://app.woopsocial.com/api-access) and use `https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp?api_key=%2A%2A%2A |

The API key is a password: never paste it into shared chats or commit it.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/woopsocial.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

md
returns a link; the user opens it, approves, and tells you when they're done. Confirm with
`social_accounts_list`. Repeat per platform.

Find IDs yourself with `projects_list` and `social_accounts_list`; never ask the user to paste
IDs.

## 3. Upload the clips

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/check_setup.py (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

python
system = platform.system()
INSTALL_FFMPEG = {"Darwin": "brew install ffmpeg", "Windows": "winget install ffmpeg",
                  "Linux": "sudo apt install ffmpeg   (or your distro's package manager)"}.get(system, "install ffmpeg")
ok = True

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/make_shorts.py (reported line 70)May include surrounding context.

python
def check_ffmpeg():
    if not shutil.which("ffmpeg") or not shutil.which("ffprobe"):
        sys.exit("ffmpeg is not installed. Mac: brew install ffmpeg. Windows: winget install ffmpeg. "
                 "Linux: sudo apt install ffmpeg.")
    load_pillow()

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/check_setup.py (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

python
line("ok", "Python", platform.python_version())

if shutil.which("ffmpeg") and shutil.which("ffprobe"):
    v = subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-version"], capture_output=True, text=True).stdout.split("\n")[0]
    line("ok", "ffmpeg", v.replace("ffmpeg version ", "")[:60])
else:
    ok = False

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/make_shorts.py (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

python
def run(cmd, **kw):
    r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, **kw)
    if r.returncode != 0:
        sys.exit("ffmpeg failed:\n" + r.stderr[-1500:])
    return r.stdout

Tainted flow: 'cmd' from open (line 75, file read) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/make_shorts.py (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

python
def run(cmd, **kw):
    r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, **kw)
    if r.returncode != 0:
        sys.exit("ffmpeg failed:\n" + r.stderr[-1500:])
    return r.stdout

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/make_shorts.py (reported line 296)May include surrounding context.

python
urllib.request.urlretrieve(FONT_URL + FONT_FILES[0], path)
    except Exception:
        if shutil.which("curl"):
            subprocess.run(["curl", "-sfL", FONT_URL + FONT_FILES[0], "-o", path], check=False)
    if os.path.exists(path) and os.path.getsize(path) > 10000:
        return ImageFont.truetype(path, size)
    warn("caption font missing; using Pillow's default font")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.py (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

python
import urllib.error, urllib.request

API = {
    "groq": ("https://api.groq.com/openai/v1/audio/transcriptions", "GROQ_API_KEY", "whisper-large-v3-turbo"),
    "openai": ("https://api.openai.com/v1/audio/transcriptions", "OPENAI_API_KEY", "whisper-1"),
}
API_LIMIT = 24 * 1024 * 1024  # both APIs refuse files over 25 MB

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.py (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

python
API = {
    "groq": ("https://api.groq.com/openai/v1/audio/transcriptions", "GROQ_API_KEY", "whisper-large-v3-turbo"),
    "openai": ("https://api.openai.com/v1/audio/transcriptions", "OPENAI_API_KEY", "whisper-1"),
}
API_LIMIT = 24 * 1024 * 1024  # both APIs refuse files over 25 MB
CHUNK_SECONDS = 20 * 60

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.py (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

python
def need_ffmpeg():
    if not shutil.which("ffmpeg") or not shutil.which("ffprobe"):
        sys.exit("ffmpeg is not installed. Mac: brew install ffmpeg. Windows: winget install ffmpeg. "
                 "Linux: sudo apt install ffmpeg (or your distro's package).")


def duration(path):

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.py (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

python
def duration(path):
    out = subprocess.run(["ffprobe", "-v", "error", "-show_entries", "format=duration", "-of",
                          "default=nw=1:nk=1", path], capture_output=True, text=True).stdout.strip()
    try:
        return float(out)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.py (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

python
if length is not None:
        cmd += ["-t", f"{length:.3f}"]
    cmd += ["-vn", "-ac", "1", "-ar", "16000", "-c:a", "libmp3lame", "-b:a", bitrate, dst]
    subprocess.run(cmd, check=True)


# ---------- routes ----------

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.py (reported line 108)May include surrounding context.

python
cmd = ["curl", "-sS", url, "-H", f"Authorization: Bearer {key}", "-F", f"file=@{file_path}"]
            for name, value in fields:
                cmd += ["-F", f"{name}={value}"]
            return json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout)
        sys.exit(f"Could not reach the transcription API: {e.reason}")

Tainted flow: 'cmd' from os.environ.get (line 105, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.py (reported line 108)May include surrounding context.

python
cmd = ["curl", "-sS", url, "-H", f"Authorization: Bearer {key}", "-F", f"file=@{file_path}"]
            for name, value in fields:
                cmd += ["-F", f"{name}={value}"]
            return json.loads(subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout)
        sys.exit(f"Could not reach the transcription API: {e.reason}")

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The fallback passes an unvalidated session-provided uploadUrl directly to curl without an option terminator, so a value such as '--config=/path/to/file' can be interpreted as a curl option rather than a URL. Independently, unrestricted destinations let a tampered session redirect the selected video's bytes to an attacker or internal service; exploitation requires control of session data, and the curl-specific path requires the certificate-error fallback.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/upload_parts.py (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

python
def put_with_curl(url, chunk):
    """Fallback for Python builds without system certificates (common on macOS)."""
    result = subprocess.run(
        ["curl", "-fsS", "-X", "PUT", "-H", "Content-Type: application/octet-stream",
         "--data-binary", "@-", "-o", os.devnull, "-w", "%{http_code}", url],
        input=chunk, capture_output=True, timeout=300)