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Security audit

pinterest-skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill suspicious because scanners report risks involving media uploads, image redirects, and undeclared tool scope; the scan was partial, so evidence is incomplete.

Consider the media upload destination and timing, how credentials are handled, and whether the skill needs its broad file, network, shell, and MCP capabilities. The scan covered 30 of 32 components and was marked partial; some static checks were degraded and some references were unresolved, so the evidence is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/page.py
Finding

Image redirects bypass private-network restrictions

Content
View full analysis

Impact

Blind SSRF permits attacker-directed GET requests to internal HTTP services accessible from the machine. The request occurs before response-size and image-format checks, so non-image responses do not prevent internal access. Secret disclosure or execution through a particular internal service is not established.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
Findings (28)

Context Leakage

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/upload_parts.py (reported line 2)May include surrounding context.

python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Upload one file to a WoopSocial media upload session (standard library only).

WoopSocial uploads work in three steps:
  1. The agent calls `media_uploads_create_session` with the projectId and the file size in bytes.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: file_read, file_write, mcp, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

User media is uploaded to WoopSocial before the preview approval, without a clear pre-upload privacy notice.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The workflow uploads user media to a third-party service before the batch preview and explicit approval. Although the scheduling provider is disclosed earlier, permission to use local files or connect an account does not clearly authorize transferring every draft, so rejected or sensitive media can leave the computer before approval.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/woopsocial.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

md
|---|---|
| Claude (claude.ai, Desktop, Cowork) | Add WoopSocial from the [Claude directory](https://claude.ai/directory/woopsocial), click Connect and sign in |
| Cursor | Install from [cursor.directory](https://cursor.directory/plugins/woopsocial-social-media-scheduler) and sign in |
| Claude Code | `claude mcp add --transport http woopsocial "https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp"`, then restart with `claude --continue` (keeps the conversation), `/mcp`, select woopsocial, Authenticate |
| Codex | `codex mcp add woopsocial --url https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp`, then `codex mcp login woopsocial`, then start a new session (`codex resume --last` keeps this one) |
| OpenClaw | Install the [WoopSocial skill on ClawHub](https://clawhub.ai/woopsocial/skills/social-media-scheduler), or add the MCP URL to the agent's MCP config |
| Agents without sign-in support | Create an API key at [app.woopsocial.com/api-access](https://app.woopsocial.com/api-access) and use `https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp?api_k=

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/woopsocial.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

md
(claude.ai, Desktop, Cowork) | Add WoopSocial from the [Claude directory](https://claude.ai/directory/woopsocial), click Connect and sign in |
| Cursor | Install from [cursor.directory](https://cursor.directory/plugins/woopsocial-social-media-scheduler) and sign in |
| Claude Code | `claude mcp add --transport http woopsocial "https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp"`, then restart with `claude --continue` (keeps the conversation), `/mcp`, select woopsocial, Authenticate |
| Codex | `codex mcp add woopsocial --url https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp`, then `codex mcp login woopsocial`, then start a new session (`codex resume --last` keeps this one) |
| OpenClaw | Install the [WoopSocial skill on ClawHub](https://clawhub.ai/woopsocial/skills/social-media-scheduler), or add the MCP URL to the agent's MCP config |
| Agents without sign-in support | Create an API key at [app.woopsocial.com/api-access](https://app.woopsocial.com/api-access) and use `https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp?api_key=%2A%2A%2A |

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The fallback authentication instructions place a reusable API key in a URL query parameter. Such URLs can be persisted in MCP configuration and exposed through request logs, diagnostics, or copied connection strings, potentially allowing unauthorized use of the key's granted capabilities.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/woopsocial.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

md
| Claude Code | `claude mcp add --transport http woopsocial "https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp"`, then restart with `claude --continue` (keeps the conversation), `/mcp`, select woopsocial, Authenticate |
| Codex | `codex mcp add woopsocial --url https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp`, then `codex mcp login woopsocial`, then start a new session (`codex resume --last` keeps this one) |
| OpenClaw | Install the [WoopSocial skill on ClawHub](https://clawhub.ai/woopsocial/skills/social-media-scheduler), or add the MCP URL to the agent's MCP config |
| Agents without sign-in support | Create an API key at [app.woopsocial.com/api-access](https://app.woopsocial.com/api-access) and use `https://api.woopsocial.com/mcp?api_key=%2A%2A%2A |

The API key is a password: never paste it into shared chats or commit it.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/woopsocial.md (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

md
returns a link; the user opens it, approves, and tells you when they're done. Confirm with
`social_accounts_list`. Repeat per platform.

Find IDs yourself with `projects_list` and `social_accounts_list`; never ask the user to paste
IDs.

## 3. Read the boards

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/check_setup.py (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

python
system = platform.system()
INSTALL_FFMPEG = {"Darwin": "brew install ffmpeg", "Windows": "winget install ffmpeg",
                  "Linux": "sudo apt install ffmpeg   (or your distro's package manager)"}.get(system, "install ffmpeg")
PIP = "py -m pip" if system == "Windows" else "python3 -m pip"
try:   # Homebrew Python and recent Debian/Ubuntu refuse plain pip installs (PEP 668)
    import sysconfig

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/check_setup.py (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

python
line("missing", "Pillow", f"{PIP} install pillow")

if shutil.which("ffmpeg") and shutil.which("ffprobe"):
    v = subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-version"], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").stdout.split("\n")[0]
    enc = subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-hide_banner", "-encoders"], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").stdout
    filt = subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-hide_banner", "-filters"], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").stdout
    if "libx264" not in enc:

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/check_setup.py (reported line 48)May include surrounding context.

python
if shutil.which("ffmpeg") and shutil.which("ffprobe"):
    v = subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-version"], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").stdout.split("\n")[0]
    enc = subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-hide_banner", "-encoders"], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").stdout
    filt = subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-hide_banner", "-filters"], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").stdout
    if "libx264" not in enc:
        line("limited", "ffmpeg", "this build has no libx264 (H.264): install a full ffmpeg for video pins: " + INSTALL_FFMPEG)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/check_setup.py (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

python
if shutil.which("ffmpeg") and shutil.which("ffprobe"):
    v = subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-version"], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").stdout.split("\n")[0]
    enc = subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-hide_banner", "-encoders"], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").stdout
    filt = subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-hide_banner", "-filters"], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").stdout
    if "libx264" not in enc:
        line("limited", "ffmpeg", "this build has no libx264 (H.264): install a full ffmpeg for video pins: " + INSTALL_FFMPEG)
    elif " xfade " not in filt:

scripts/log.py can recommend a best design without any reported engagement metrics.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Eligibility for ranking requires age and impressions but no reported clicks or saves, while sorting treats missing engagement rates as zero. Three impression-only records can therefore produce an unsupported 'best design' recommendation that the agent may use to guide later campaigns; this is an output-integrity defect rather than code execution or data theft.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

scripts/log.py labels a pooled, cross-account and cross-format benchmark as an account median.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The benchmark pools all eligible logged pins without grouping by account or format, yet labels the result an 'Account median.' Multi-account or mixed-format logs can consequently produce misleading comparisons and recommendations, undermining the integrity of the skill's advertised account-specific analysis.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Page requests impose an English language preference without user opt-in.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

Every request sets Accept-Language: en, regardless of the user's language or intended audience. Sites honoring this header may return English content that then drives the pin's keywords and copy, with no documented justification or user choice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/page.py (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

python
return e.geturl() or url, e.code, body if binary else body.decode("utf-8", "replace")
    except urllib.error.URLError as e:
        if "CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED" in str(e) and shutil.which("curl"):
            out = subprocess.run(["curl", "-sL", "--proto", "=http,https", "--proto-redir", "=http,https",
                                  "--max-filesize", str(MAX_BYTES), "-A", UA, "-w", "\n%{url_effective} %{http_code}", url],
                                 capture_output=True, timeout=60)
            body, _, tail = out.stdout.rpartition(b"\n")

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/pin_check.py (reported line 140)May include surrounding context.

python
if problems and fix and shutil.which("ffmpeg"):
        out = fixed_path(base, pin, ".mp4")
        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(out), exist_ok=True)
        subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-y", "-v", "error", "-i", path, "-c:v", "libx264", "-preset", "medium", "-crf", "20",
                        "-pix_fmt", "yuv420p", "-c:a", "aac", "-b:a", "160k", "-movflags", "+faststart", out], check=True)
        pin["file"] = P.rel(out, base)
        rep.fixed(pid, "; ".join(problems) + f": re-encoded as {pin['file']}")

Dynamic import via __import__()

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Dynamic import() can load arbitrary modules at runtime, bypassing static analysis and potentially importing malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/pinlib.py (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

python
STOP = set("a an and are as at be by for from how i in is it its of on or our that the this to was we what when "
           "where which who why will with you your vs into than then them they these those can do does not no".split())
ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,79}$")
LANCZOS = getattr(getattr(__import__("PIL.Image", fromlist=["Image"]), "Resampling", None), "LANCZOS", None) \
    or __import__("PIL.Image", fromlist=["Image"]).LANCZOS

Dynamic import via __import__()

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Dynamic import() can load arbitrary modules at runtime, bypassing static analysis and potentially importing malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/pinlib.py (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

python
"where which who why will with you your vs into than then them they these those can do does not no".split())
ID_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,79}$")
LANCZOS = getattr(getattr(__import__("PIL.Image", fromlist=["Image"]), "Resampling", None), "LANCZOS", None) \
    or __import__("PIL.Image", fromlist=["Image"]).LANCZOS


def load_plan(path):

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/pinlib.py (reported line 146)May include surrounding context.

python
def run_text(cmd):
    r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
    return r

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/pinlib.py (reported line 173)May include surrounding context.

python
import io
    if not shutil.which("ffmpeg"):
        return None
    r = subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-v", "error", "-ss", str(t), "-i", path, "-frames:v", "1", "-f", "image2pipe",
                        "-vcodec", "png", "-"], capture_output=True)
    if not r.stdout:
        return None

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/render_pins.py (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

python
urllib.request.urlretrieve(url, part)
    except Exception:
        if shutil.which("curl"):
            subprocess.run(["curl", "-sfL", url, "-o", part], check=False)
    if not os.path.exists(part) or os.path.getsize(part) < 10000:
        if os.path.exists(part):
            os.remove(part)

Expired seasonal pins are scheduled as evergreen despite documentation promising not to schedule pins after their moment.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

When a seasonal moment has passed, the scheduler clears the seasonal restriction and generates an evergreen schedule instead of excluding the pin. This fails open against the documented scheduling constraint and can place stale promotional content in publishable requests, although the script itself does not publish and user review reduces the risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

Although the subprocess does not use a shell, its destination URL comes directly from session JSON without scheme or destination validation, as does the primary Python upload path. A substituted session can send the selected file's bytes to an attacker-controlled endpoint; the curl fallback also lacks an end-of-options separator for its untrusted URL argument.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/upload_parts.py (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

python
def put_with_curl(url, chunk):
    """Fallback for Python builds without system certificates (common on macOS)."""
    result = subprocess.run(
        ["curl", "-fsS", "-X", "PUT", "-H", "Content-Type: application/octet-stream",
         "--data-binary", "@-", "-o", os.devnull, "-w", "%{http_code}", url],
        input=chunk, capture_output=True, timeout=300)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/video.py (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

python
def run(cmd):
    r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
    if r.returncode != 0:
        sys.exit("ffmpeg failed:\n" + r.stderr[-1500:])

Recursively deletes the output directory's .stills subdirectory without disclosing the deletion.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The script reuses a predictable .stills directory beside the output with exist_ok=True and subsequently deletes that entire directory recursively. If it already contains user data or belongs to another concurrent run, cleanup can destroy unrelated files; numbered frame writes can also overwrite existing contents before cleanup.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.