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Security audit

Snowsand Jira

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Jira skill is mostly coherent, but it can make live Jira changes and can send Jira API credentials to an unvalidated URL configured in the environment.

Review before installing. Use this only with a narrowly permissioned Jira API token, set JIRA_BASE_URL only to your HTTPS Atlassian tenant, and treat all create, update, comment, transition, worklog, raw API, link, and attachment examples as live Jira changes that should be explicitly approved.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/jira.py:24
Finding

Jira credentials can be transmitted to an arbitrary or plaintext destination

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 55, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/jira.py (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

python
req = Request(url, data=body, headers=headers, method=method)
    
    try:
        with urlopen(req) as resp:
            content = resp.read().decode()
            return json.loads(content) if content else {}
    except HTTPError as e:

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill documents use of environment variables and outbound network access to Jira, but it does not declare any tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That omission weakens execution guardrails and can allow the skill to be invoked with broader capabilities than users or the platform expect, especially because it can read credentials from the environment and perform remote actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The trigger language is very broad, including phrases like any Atlassian Jira Cloud task, which increases the chance of unintended invocation. In a skill that can create, update, transition, comment on issues, and log work, accidental activation can lead to unintended changes in production project data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The description advertises issue creation and updates but does not clearly warn that these operations modify remote Jira data. This is dangerous because users may treat the skill as informational while it is actually capable of making authenticated state changes in an external system.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 165)May include surrounding context.

md
"$JIRA_BASE_URL/rest/api/3/issue/PROJ-123" | jq .

# POST request
curl -s -X POST -u "$JIRA_USER_EMAIL:$JIRA_API_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"body": {"type": "doc", "version": 1, "content": [{"type": "paragraph", "content": [{"type": "text", "text": "Comment"}]}]}}' \
  "$JIRA_BASE_URL/rest/api/3/issue/PROJ-123/comment" | jq .

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/fields.md (reported line 119)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Create link
curl -X POST -u "$JIRA_USER_EMAIL:$JIRA_API_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "type": {"name": "Blocks"},

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill exposes state-changing Jira operations such as create, update, comment, transition, and worklog without any confirmation, dry-run mode, or user-visible warning before execution. In an agent setting, ambiguous prompts, prompt injection from issue content, or mistaken tool selection could cause unintended writes to production Jira data, workflow changes, or audit-affecting worklog entries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The authentication section instructs users to supply an account email and API token but provides no warning about protecting those credentials or avoiding logging and sharing them. While this is standard for Jira API usage, omitting basic credential-handling guidance increases the risk of accidental exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.