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Security audit

FamilyWall

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a real FamilyWall integration, but it needs Review because its media download path can expose FamilyWall session credentials to arbitrary URLs and write files outside the intended download area.

Install only if you trust the publisher and can keep the FamilyWall account credentials scoped to this use. Avoid using media download --url with any URL not copied directly from FamilyWall, and download media only into a dedicated empty directory until the URL allowlist and filename/path handling are fixed. Treat location, member, and message outputs as private family data.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/client.py:436
Finding

FamilyWall Session Credentials Disclosed to Arbitrary Media URLs

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/familywall.py:291
Finding

Path Traversal and Arbitrary File Overwrite Through Media Filenames

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Findings (28)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

Test connection:

bash
source ~/.openclaw/.env && {baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py status

Quick Reference

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 86)May include surrounding context.

Test connection:

bash
source ~/.openclaw/.env && {baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py status

Quick Reference

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 93)May include surrounding context.

Test connection:

bash
source ~/.openclaw/.env && {baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py status

Quick Reference

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 105)May include surrounding context.

Test connection:

bash
source ~/.openclaw/.env && {baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py status

Quick Reference

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 116)May include surrounding context.

Test connection:

bash
source ~/.openclaw/.env && {baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py status

Quick Reference

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 128)May include surrounding context.

Test connection:

bash
source ~/.openclaw/.env && {baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py status

Quick Reference

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 148)May include surrounding context.

Test connection:

bash
source ~/.openclaw/.env && {baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py status

Quick Reference

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 162)May include surrounding context.

Test connection:

bash
source ~/.openclaw/.env && {baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py status

Quick Reference

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 173)May include surrounding context.

Test connection:

bash
source ~/.openclaw/.env && {baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py status

Quick Reference

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 180)May include surrounding context.

Test connection:

bash
source ~/.openclaw/.env && {baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py status

Quick Reference

Exfiltration Commands

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 119)May include surrounding context.

source ~/.openclaw/.env

Get thread list first

{baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py messages threads

Send message to a thread

{baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py messages send "imthread/12345_67890" "Dinner is ready!"

text

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The locations command retrieves family member location information, which is highly privacy-sensitive, and prints it directly. The code contains no confirmation prompt or explicit disclosure that executing this command will access and reveal geolocation data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill clearly relies on sensitive capabilities (environment-sourced credentials and outbound network access) but does not declare any tool scope or permission boundaries. That omission increases the chance the runtime grants broader access than intended and prevents reviewers from understanding the skill's effective privilege level.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises retrieval of family member locations without any privacy warning, consent guidance, or confirmation requirement. Location data is highly sensitive, and broad triggers make accidental disclosure more likely in shared or ambiguous conversations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill supports reading messages and downloading media to local files without warning about privacy exposure or filesystem impact. This creates risk of unintended access to private family communications and uncontrolled writes of potentially sensitive or unsafe files to disk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases include very generic terms such as "where is", "recipe", "add to list", and "download photo", which can match ordinary conversation and unintentionally invoke a privileged integration. In this skill, accidental invocation is more dangerous because it can access family messages, locations, lists, and media tied to real user accounts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 102)May include surrounding context.

{baseDir}/scripts/familywall.py lists add "tasklist/12345_67890" "Eggs" --quantity "12"

text

### Create a calendar event

```bash
source ~/.openclaw/.env

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 213)May include surrounding context.

md
| Media | `/media/...` | Download media files (GET with session auth) |
| Location | `loclist` | Get member locations |
| Wall | `walllist` | Get wall/feed posts |
| Meals | `mplistinterval` | List planned meals in range |
| Meals | `mpcreate` | Add dish to meal plan |
| Meals | `mpmealput` | Create/edit a meal |
| Recipes | `mprecipeput` | Create/edit a recipe |

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 133)May include surrounding context.

md
class FamilyWallClient:
    """Client for interacting with the FamilyWall API."""

    BASE_URL = "https://api.familywall.com/api"
    PARTNER_SCOPE = "Family"

    def __init__(self, timezone=None):

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 186)May include surrounding context.

md
class FamilyWallClient:
    """Client for interacting with the FamilyWall API."""

    BASE_URL = "https://api.familywall.com/api"
    PARTNER_SCOPE = "Family"

    def __init__(self, timezone=None):

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/client.py (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

python
class FamilyWallClient:
    """Client for interacting with the FamilyWall API."""

    BASE_URL = "https://api.familywall.com/api"
    PARTNER_SCOPE = "Family"

    def __init__(self, timezone=None):

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The delete_event method performs a remote deletion operation via the FamilyWall API, but the code provides no confirmation prompt, logging, or explicit warning to the user before or during the action. Because this is an irreversible state-changing operation and this file contains no user-facing disclosure around it, the deletion lacks the safety warning required for code files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

download_media writes remote content to an arbitrary caller-supplied output_path with no path validation, filename restrictions, or safe-directory enforcement. In an agent context, an attacker could influence the destination path and cause overwrite or placement of untrusted files in sensitive locations, making this substantially more dangerous than a normal SDK helper.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The members command fetches and outputs personally identifiable information including email addresses, phone numbers, account IDs, and last login data. Although the code prints the resulting JSON, there is no disclosure in the command help, comments, or docstrings warning that sensitive family data will be exposed to the terminal.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The media download command accepts an arbitrary user-supplied URL and passes it to the client downloader, allowing the skill to fetch resources not obtained from FamilyWall message metadata. In an agent context, this broadens the skill from 'download FamilyWall attachments' into a generic network fetch primitive, which can enable SSRF-style access to internal services or unintended exfiltration/retrieval depending on where the client runs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.