T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:5- Finding
Unpinned Remote Dependency Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:5
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency from a mutable remote repository
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"📝","requires":{"bins":["qmd"]},"install":[{"id":"node","kind":"node","package":"https://github.com/tobi/qmd","bins":["qmd"],"label":"Install qmd (node)"}]}}Technical Analysis
The installation metadata references the mutable GitHub repository URL
https://github.com/tobi/qmdwithout specifying an immutable commit hash, an exact release version, or an integrity checksum. As a result, the dependency retrieved during installation may differ from the version that was available when this Skill was audited.This creates a supply-chain vulnerability because control of the effective installation payload remains with the upstream repository. If its default branch, package metadata, release process, or maintainer account is compromised, subsequent installations could retrieve altered code. Package installation hooks or the installed
qmdexecutable could then run that code with the privileges of the user or agent performing the installation.No evidence establishes that the current upstream project is malicious. The confirmed issue is the absence of immutable dependency pinning and integrity verification.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream repository, a maintainer account, or another mechanism capable of changing the repository's default installation content.
- The attacker adds malicious package code, lifecycle hooks, or executable behavior to the remotely referenced dependency.
- A user or agent installs
qmdthrough the Skill's installation metadata. - The installer resolves the mutable repository URL and downloads the attacker-controlled revision.
- Malicious code executes during package installation or when the installed
qmdbinary is later invoked. - The code operates with the privileges and d ...[truncated 745 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the mutable repository reference with an exact, audited release version or immutable commit hash.
- Prefer a trusted package registry artifact with an exact version rather than installing directly from a repository's default branch.
- Record and verify a cryptographic integrity hash for the downloaded package or archive.
- Use a lockfile where supported and commit it to the Skill package.
- Disable or strictly review package lifecycle scripts during installation.
- Periodically audit the pinned dependency and update it through an explicit review process rather than automatically tracking upstream changes.
- Run installation and execution with least privilege, ideally in a sandbox without access to unrelated credentials or sensitive directories.
