T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
digest_daily.py:30- Finding
Unfiltered Sensitive Data Persisted in Digest Output
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
digest_daily.py, lines 30-35, 60-75, and 87-91
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive data exposure through unfiltered file generation
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
python if collecting: if line.strip().startswith('-'): items.append(line.strip().lstrip('- ').rstrip()) elif line.strip() == '' or line.strip().startswith('#'): # stop on blank or new section-ish header break else: # treat as continuation of bullet if items: items[-1] = items[-1] + ' ' + line.strip() else: if line.strip(): items.append(line.strip())python summary = text_today.strip().splitlines() if summary: summary = summary[:5] summary_text = ' '.join(l.strip() for l in summary) else: summary_text = '' # Build digest sections parts = [] if summary_text: parts.append("## Résumé\n" + summary_text.strip()) if dec: parts.append("## Décisions\n" + '\n'.join(f"- {i}" for i in dec)) if les: parts.append("## Leçons / Points clés\n" + '\n'.join(f"- {i}" for i in les)) if act: parts.append("## Prochaines étapes\n" + '\n'.join(f"- {i}" for i in act)) if ques: parts.append("## Questions\n" + '\n'.join(f"- {i}" for i in ques))python out_path = os.path.join(out_dir, f"digest-{date_str}.md") with open(out_path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f: f.write(content) print(f"Wrote {out_path}")Technical Analysis
The current day's memory file is treated as untrusted input, but its content is copied into the generated digest without any sensitive-data detection or redaction. The first five lines are incorporated into
summary_text, while entries from recognized sections are appended to the output as extracted. The resulting content is then written directly to a persistent Markdown file.Consequently, credential ...[truncated 2133 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Introduce a centralized sanitization function and apply it to all memory-derived text before constructing any digest section.
- Detect and redact common credential forms, including API-key prefixes, bearer tokens, authorization headers, passwords in assignments or URLs, PEM private-key blocks, cloud credentials, and high-entropy token-like strings.
- Replace the complete sensitive value with a fixed marker such as
[REDACTED]; do not retain prefixes, suffixes, or partial fragments that could aid reconstruction. - Consider decoded representations where practical, including base64-encoded credential material, while applying strict size limits to avoid denial-of-service behavior.
- Use an allowlisted structured parser for digest fields instead of copying the first five raw lines as a fallback summary. If safe summarization is unavailable, emit a generic placeholder rather than raw memory content.
- Add output-level defense in depth: scan the fully assembled
contentimmediately before writing and abort safely if a likely secret remains. - Write the digest atomically with restrictive permissions, such as creating a temporary file with mode
0600injournals/digest/and replacing the destination only after validation succeeds. - Add automated tests covering secrets in summary lines, recognized sections, multiline entries, authorization headers, PEM keys, encoded values, and credentials split across adjacent lines.
- Document detection limitations and instruct users to rotate any credential that was previously copied into a generated digest.
