T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:12
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:12-19` and `SKILL.md:32-33` **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned and unverified third-party dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code From `SKILL.md:12-19`: ```yaml "install": [ { "id": "brew", "kind": "brew", "formula": "antoniorodr/memo/memo", "bins": ["memo"], "label": "Install memo via Homebrew", }, ], ``` From `SKILL.md:32-33`: ```markdown - Install (Homebrew): `brew tap antoniorodr/memo && brew install antoniorodr/memo/memo` - Manual (pip): `pip install .` (after cloning the repo) ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation workflows obtain executable code from a third-party Homebrew tap or an unspecified cloned repository without pinning an immutable release, commit, package digest, or cryptographic checksum. The Homebrew command installs whichever formula and package version the third-party tap serves at installation time. The manual pip workflow also omits the repository URL, trusted revision, signature verification, dependency lock file, and isolated-environment requirement. As a result, the code audited in this project does not uniquely determine the code that users will execute. This creates a supply-chain trust gap. If the upstream repository, Homebrew tap, release process, maintainer account, or package contents are compromised, a later installation can execute code that was not present during this audit. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream `memo` repository, its Homebrew tap, a maintainer account, or the distribution workflow. 2. The attacker modifies the formula, package source, build instructions, or transitive dependencies to include malicious code. 3. A user follows the documented unpinned Homebrew command or clones an unspecified current revision and runs `pip install .`. 4. The installation process builds or installs the attacker-controlled code under the user's account. 5. The malicious ...[truncated 955 chars]
- Remediation
- <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin `memo` to a reviewed, immutable release or commit rather than installing the current state of a mutable third-party tap. 2. Publish the expected SHA-256 digest or equivalent cryptographic checksum for the selected artifact and verify it before installation. 3. Where supported, verify a signed release tag, package signature, or signed provenance record against a documented maintainer key. 4. Replace the generic Homebrew installation metadata with a version-constrained, reviewed formula and document the exact expected formula revision. 5. For manual installation, specify the official repository URL and an immutable commit hash. For example, require checkout of a documented commit before running installation. 6. Install Python packages in an isolated virtual environment rather than into a global or shared interpreter. 7. Use a reviewed dependency lock file with hashes for all transitive Python dependencies. 8. Avoid installation modes that execute mutable build hooks unless those hooks and their dependencies have been reviewed. 9. Establish an update process in which new upstream versions are reviewed, checksums are updated intentionally, and security-sensitive permission behavior is retested before changing the pinned version. 10. Clearly document that Notes.app Automation permission should be granted only after the installed binary and its provenance have been verified. ]]>