T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Error
- Location
scripts/smyx_livestock_fever_detection_analysis.py:43- Finding
Caller-Controlled Identity Enables Unauthorized Account Impersonation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/smyx_livestock_fever_detection_analysis.py:43,57;skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:464-477,548-562,576-612
Vulnerability Type: Improper authentication and caller-controlled identity selection
Risk Level: HighComplete Code Snippets
scripts/smyx_livestock_fever_detection_analysis.py:43,57python parser.add_argument("--open-id", required=False, help=argparse.SUPPRESS) # ... OpenIdUtil.resolve_current_open_id(args.open_id, use_current=bool(args.open_id))skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:464-477python @classmethod def resolve_current_open_id(cls, open_id=None, use_current=True): """解析并初始化当前 open-id，返回最终使用值。""" resolved_open_id = (open_id or "").strip() if isinstance(open_id, str) else open_id if not resolved_open_id and use_current: resolved_open_id = ConstantEnum.CURRENT__OPEN_ID or ConstantEnum.CURRENT__USER_NAME if not resolved_open_id: resolved_open_id = cls.get_api_key_file_open_id() if not resolved_open_id: resolved_open_id = cls.get_or_create_default_open_id() ConstantEnum.CURRENT__OPEN_ID = resolved_open_id if not ConstantEnum.CURRENT__USER_NAME: ConstantEnum.CURRENT__USER_NAME = resolved_open_id return resolved_open_idskills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:548-562python def _get_or_create_user(username): _url = ApiEnum.BASE_URL_HEALTH + "/sys/phoneLogin" open_id = username _data = { "silent": 1, "register": 1, "openId": open_id, "mobile": username, "source": ConstantEnum.DEFAULT__SKILL_HUB_NAME } try: _response = requests.post(_url, json=_data) if _response.status_code == 200: _response_json = _response.json() if _response_json and _response_json.get("success"): return _response_json and _response_json.get("result")skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:576-612python i ...[truncated 4538 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
-
Remove caller-controlled identity selection
- Remove the
--open-idCLI argument from the ordinary entry point. - Do not treat hiding an argument with
argparse.SUPPRESSas an access-control mechanism.
- Remove the
-
Bind identity to authenticated platform context
- Obtain the identity only from a trusted, authenticated upstream context.
- Cryptographically bind that identity to the current request or session.
- Reject conflicting identity values supplied through CLI arguments, environment variables, or mutable workspace files.
-
Harden server-side authentication
- Do not issue bearer tokens solely from a caller-supplied
openIdor mobile value. - Require signed platform assertions, a one-time challenge, or another verifiable proof of identity ownership.
- Separate account registration from authentication and prohibit silent registration from authenticating an existing account.
- Do not issue bearer tokens solely from a caller-supplied
-
Constrain operational overrides
- If identity overrides are required for administration, place them behind a separate privileged interface.
- Require explicit administrator authentication, use an allowlist of permitted identities, and record an audit event for every override.
-
Protect and scope tokens
- Scope issued tokens to the minimum required scene and operations.
- Avoid storing tokens for different identities in a broadly shared workspace database.
- Apply restrictive file permissions, token expiration, rotation, and revocation.
- Clear cached tokens when the authenticated platform identity changes.
-
Enforce backend ownership checks
- Historical-report and analysis-result endpoints must independently verify that each requested record belongs to the authenticated principal.
- Do not rely only on client-supplied fields such as
pnaUserName,openId, or tenant metadata.
-