T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
skills/smyx_common/scripts/config-dev.yaml:2- Finding
Sensitive Medical Images and Authentication Credentials Transmitted over Plaintext HTTP
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a Review case because it handles sensitive infant health images through cloud services while using unsafe default networking and silent identity/token persistence.
Install only if you are comfortable sending infant diaper/stool media and report queries to the publisher's cloud service and with the skill silently managing a local/backend identity. Before use, require HTTPS production endpoints, remove the dev configuration, fix image-only validation, make history lookup and uploads explicit opt-in actions, and protect or avoid persistent tokens.
skills/smyx_common/scripts/config-dev.yaml:2Sensitive Medical Images and Authentication Credentials Transmitted over Plaintext HTTP
skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:572Credential Disclosure through Unrestricted Absolute Request URLs
skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py:460Reusable Authentication Tokens Stored without Application-Level Protection
skills/smyx_analysis/requirements.txt:3Incorrect Dependency Distribution Name Creates Dependency-Confusion Exposure
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
Authenticated network requests, automatic account creation, token persistence, and workspace file access are significant backend and local capabilities not reflected in the narrow medical-screening description. In the context of infant-health data, hidden auth/session and persistence logic can enable excessive data retention, account confusion, and unauthorized access to sensitive reports.
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
---
name: "smyx-infant-stool-color-abnormality-analysis"
description: "Using a fixed camera above the baby-changing table or a smartphone, the system captures high-resolution images of the diaper area (or the stool itself), and uses AI visual analysis to identify stool color: normal yellow / yellow-green, abnormal clay-pale (white/clay-like, suggesting biliary obstruction), bright red (lower-GI bleeding), dark red / tarry black (upper-GI bleeding), etc. | 通过婴儿护理台上方固定摄像头或手机拍摄尿不湿区域(或直接拍摄排泄物)的高清图像,利用AI视觉分析技术识别大便颜色,包括正常黄色/黄绿色�
The skill description does not clearly warn that sensitive infant images and report queries may be transmitted to remote cloud/API services. In this context, incomplete disclosure undermines informed consent and can lead to unauthorized exposure of highly sensitive child-health data and metadata.
Automatic fallback to a local default user and account creation is unrelated to image analysis and creates a serious risk of identity confusion or cross-user data mixing. For infant medical reports, silently reusing or creating identities can cause one person's reports to be associated with another session or exposed without meaningful consent.
The implementation accepts video files and video URLs even though the skill is described as analyzing still images of infant stool color. This capability mismatch expands data collection beyond the stated purpose and increases privacy and compliance risk because diaper-area video is more sensitive, more voluminous, and easier to misuse than a single image.
The inline user-facing validation message says a local video path or network video URL is required, and nearby comments refer to video handling. This documentation-level framing conflicts with the manifest, which describes high-resolution image capture and analysis for stool color identification.
The implementation materially diverges from the declared skill purpose: it accepts local or remote MP4 video inputs and exposes video-history retrieval, while the manifest describes infant stool image-color analysis. In a sensitive pediatric/health context, this kind of capability mismatch is dangerous because users may unknowingly provide broader, more privacy-invasive footage than expected, and downstream systems may grant permissions or trust based on the manifest rather than the actual behavior.
The code reads a workspace identity file and, if absent, creates and persists a default user identity in a local database. For a medical-image analysis skill, this is an unjustified identity-management capability that can silently bind activity to local credentials or create shadow identities without user knowledge.
This utility performs authenticated API activity, token handling, local user lookup, and even automatic account provisioning, which is far beyond the declared purpose of infant stool-color image analysis. In this skill context, such hidden identity and network side effects materially increase the risk of unauthorized data transmission, account misuse, and covert expansion of capability without user awareness.
The skill declares broad operational behavior such as shell execution, network access, file read/write, and environment usage, but does not constrain those capabilities with an explicit tool scope. In an agent setting, undocumented broad capability combined with medical-image handling and cloud access increases the chance of unintended data exposure or misuse of local/system resources.
The skill documentation expands from local visual analysis into cloud-based historical report retrieval and report-link output, introducing additional data flows for sensitive child-health information. Undeclared or weakly justified expansion of scope increases exposure of medical images and associated metadata beyond the immediate screening task.
A default trigger that activates on any uploaded diaper-area image needing analysis is overly broad and can cause unintended invocation on sensitive infant imagery. Over-triggering in an agent environment risks accidental transmission or persistence of highly sensitive content without sufficiently specific user intent.
Automatic cloud history lookup is not necessary for the core purpose of classifying stool color from a supplied image and introduces extra opportunities to access or disclose prior medical records. In a privacy-sensitive infant-health context, auto-triggered record retrieval can expose more data than the user intended to request.
Detected: suspicious.install_untrusted_source