T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
scripts/smyx_fruit_ripeness_grading_analysis.py:43- Finding
Caller-Controlled Open ID Enables Cross-User Account Impersonation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/smyx_fruit_ripeness_grading_analysis.py:43-58;skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:449-462, 552-563, 576-612
Vulnerability Type: Improper authentication and user-controlled identity assertion
Risk Level: HighComplete Code Snippets
scripts/smyx_fruit_ripeness_grading_analysis.py:43-58:python parser.add_argument("--open-id", required=False, help=argparse.SUPPRESS) parser.add_argument("--list", action='store_true', help="显示宠物健康分析列表清单") parser.add_argument("--api-url", help="服务端API地址") parser.add_argument("--api-key", help=argparse.SUPPRESS) parser.add_argument("--output", help="结果输出文件路径") parser.add_argument("--detail", choices=["basic", "standard", "json"], default=ConstantEnum.DEFAULT__OUTPUT_LEVEL, help="输出详细程度") parser.add_argument("--export-env-only", action='store_true', help="仅输出 export 命令设置环境变量,不执行分析") args = parser.parse_args() try: # 初始化内部用户身份;不要求用户输入,也不在帮助信息中展示。 OpenIdUtil.resolve_current_open_id(args.open_id, use_current=bool(args.open_id))skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:449-462:python def resolve_current_open_id(cls, open_id=None, use_current=True): """解析并初始化当前 open-id,返回最终使用值。""" resolved_open_id = (open_id or "").strip() if isinstance(open_id, str) else open_id if not resolved_open_id and use_current: resolved_open_id = ConstantEnum.CURRENT__OPEN_ID or ConstantEnum.CURRENT__USER_NAME if not resolved_open_id: resolved_open_id = cls.get_api_key_file_open_id() if not resolved_open_id: resolved_open_id = cls.get_or_create_default_open_id() ConstantEnum.CURRENT__OPEN_ID = resolved_open_id if not ConstantEnum.CURRENT__USER_NAME: ConstantEnum.CURRENT__USER_NAME = resolved_open_id return resolved_open_idskills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:552-563:`` ...[truncated 5039 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
--open-idfrom the public CLI and do not permit ordinary callers to select an account identity. - Obtain identity only from an authenticated, integrity-protected upstream context. Use a signed assertion with issuer, audience, expiration, and nonce validation.
- Require the server to verify ownership before issuing tokens. An identifier alone must never be sufficient for login or token creation.
- Disable silent registration/login for arbitrary supplied identifiers. Registration and authentication should be separate, explicitly authorized operations.
- Bind report queries to the subject encoded in the authenticated server-issued token rather than accepting a client-selected user identifier.
- If an internal identity override is operationally necessary, restrict it to an administrator-only interface and require explicit authorization checks, audit logging, and a narrowly scoped impersonation grant.
- Avoid storing tokens obtained through unverified identity assertions. Invalidate any tokens previously issued through this flow and review associated access logs for cross-account activity.
- Add negative authorization tests proving that one user cannot obtain credentials or report records by submitting another user’s Open ID.
- Remove
