T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Error
- Location
scripts/smyx_dementia_confusion_orientation_analysis.py:55- Finding
Unverified Caller-Controlled Identity Enables Cloud Account Impersonation and Report Access
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/smyx_dementia_confusion_orientation_analysis.py:55, 64-69;skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:453-466, 550-565, 578-612
Vulnerability Type: Improper authentication and identity binding
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
scripts/smyx_dementia_confusion_orientation_analysis.py:55, 64-69python parser.add_argument("--open-id", required=False, help=argparse.SUPPRESS) args = parser.parse_args() try: # Initialize the internal user identity. OpenIdUtil.resolve_current_open_id( args.open_id, use_current=bool(args.open_id) ) if args.list: open_id = ConstantEnum.CURRENT__OPEN_ID result = show_analyze_list(open_id) print(result) exit(0)skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:453-466python @classmethod def resolve_current_open_id(cls, open_id=None, use_current=True): """Resolve and initialize the current open ID.""" resolved_open_id = (open_id or "").strip() if isinstance(open_id, str) else open_id if not resolved_open_id and use_current: resolved_open_id = ConstantEnum.CURRENT__OPEN_ID or ConstantEnum.CURRENT__USER_NAME if not resolved_open_id: resolved_open_id = cls.get_api_key_file_open_id() if not resolved_open_id: resolved_open_id = cls.get_or_create_default_open_id() ConstantEnum.CURRENT__OPEN_ID = resolved_open_id if not ConstantEnum.CURRENT__USER_NAME: ConstantEnum.CURRENT__USER_NAME = resolved_open_id return resolved_open_idskills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:550-565, 578-612python def _get_or_create_user(username): _url = ApiEnum.BASE_URL_HEALTH + "/sys/phoneLogin" open_id = username _data = { "silent": 1, "register": 1, "openId": open_id, "mobile": username, "source": ConstantEnum.DEFAULT__SKILL_HUB_NAME } try: _response = requests.post(_url, json=_data) if _respons ...[truncated 4521 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the caller-controlled
--open-idoption from the public entry point. Suppressing it from help output is not a security boundary. - Derive identity only from an authenticated upstream runtime context whose integrity the Skill can verify.
- Require a cryptographically signed identity assertion, short-lived authorization code, or equivalent proof bound to the current user and Skill invocation.
- Do not use a username, mobile number, or open ID as both the account identifier and proof of authentication.
- Disable identifier-only silent login and automatic registration on the server. Registration and login should require an independently verified factor.
- Enforce resource ownership and tenant isolation on every analysis, result, and report-list endpoint, regardless of client-supplied identity fields.
- Bind issued tokens to the authenticated principal, intended client, tenant, and permitted scopes.
- Reject attempts to switch identities while cached credentials exist unless full re-authentication succeeds.
- Avoid storing bearer tokens in a broadly shared workspace database. Use an operating-system credential store or a protected per-principal token store with restrictive permissions and expiry handling.
- Add negative authorization tests verifying that one identity cannot list, retrieve, submit, or poll resources belonging to another identity.
- Remove the caller-controlled