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Security audit

ToDesk Alternatives

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a Chinese-language guide to open-source remote desktop alternatives, but its RustDesk server deployment advice asks users to run an unpinned Docker image with host networking and does not clearly explain the added exposure.

Review the RustDesk deployment command before using it. Prefer a pinned RustDesk server image with a verified digest, publish only the required TCP/UDP ports, apply firewall restrictions, and avoid host networking unless you understand and accept the reduced isolation. The recommendation content itself is not hidden or self-executing.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:45
Finding

Mutable and Unverified RustDesk Container Image

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 45-47
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

bash
docker run --name rustdesk-server -d \
  --network host \
  rustdesk/rustdesk-server:latest

Technical Analysis

The documented deployment command uses the mutable latest container tag without pinning a reviewed version or immutable image digest. It also provides no image-signature, checksum, or provenance-verification step.

Because the content referenced by latest can change after this Skill has been reviewed, users may subsequently execute a different container image than the one originally intended. If the publisher account, registry, build pipeline, or mutable tag is compromised, attacker-controlled code could be distributed through the otherwise legitimate-looking command.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the image publisher, container registry account, or upstream build pipeline.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious image under rustdesk/rustdesk-server:latest or replaces the image associated with that tag.
  3. A user follows the deployment command in SKILL.md.
  4. Docker retrieves the current unverified image represented by latest.
  5. Attacker-controlled code executes inside the container with Docker's default container capabilities and the host network access separately granted by the command.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation permits arbitrary code execution inside the deployed container. The resulting access is constrained by the container runtime but includes Docker's default capabilities and, in this command, direct use of the host network namespace. A malicious image could expose network listeners, communicate with external systems, probe host-local or internal network services, and abuse any resources or secrets made available to the container. No host filesystem mounts or explicit privileged mod ...[truncated 125 chars]

Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace latest with a reviewed release version and an immutable digest, such as:
    bash
    docker run --name rustdesk-server -d \
      --network rustdesk-net \
      rustdesk/rustdesk-server:<reviewed-version>@sha256:<verified-digest>
    
  • Verify the image digest against an authenticated vendor release channel before deployment.
  • Use image-signature and provenance verification, such as Sigstore Cosign, if supported by the publisher.
  • Document a controlled update process that reviews release notes, vulnerability reports, and digest changes before upgrading.
  • Scan the pinned image with a container vulnerability scanner and reject images containing critical unresolved vulnerabilities.
  • Avoid combining an unverified image with broad runtime permissions such as host networking.

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:45
Finding

RustDesk Container Granted Excessive Host Network Access

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 45-47
Vulnerability Type: T05: Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

bash
docker run --name rustdesk-server -d \
  --network host \
  rustdesk/rustdesk-server:latest

Technical Analysis

The --network host option places the container directly in the host's network namespace rather than an isolated Docker network. This removes an important container isolation boundary and allows processes in the container to bind directly to host interfaces and communicate with services reachable through the host network, including services that may be bound only to loopback.

This access exceeds least privilege when the server can instead operate on an isolated bridge network with only its required ports explicitly published. The risk becomes particularly significant if the container image or RustDesk service is compromised.

Attack Path

  1. A user starts the RustDesk container using the documented command.
  2. The container receives direct access to the host network namespace.
  3. An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the exposed service, compromises an upstream image, or otherwise gains code execution inside the container.
  4. The attacker enumerates interfaces and services reachable from the host network context.
  5. The attacker probes or attacks host-local and internal network services, opens unauthorized host-facing listeners, or uses the host's network position for lateral movement.

Impact Assessment

A compromised container could access network endpoints available to the host, including loopback-bound services that would normally be inaccessible from an isolated container network. It could also bind directly to host ports, interfere with existing services, expose unauthorized listeners, and use the host's network position to probe adjacent systems.

This setting does not independently grant f ...[truncated 207 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Remove --network host.
  • Create a dedicated Docker bridge network and publish only the ports required by the reviewed RustDesk server version:
    bash
    docker network create rustdesk-net
    
    docker run --name rustdesk-server -d \
      --network rustdesk-net \
      -p <required-host-port>:<required-container-port> \
      rustdesk/rustdesk-server:<reviewed-version>@sha256:<verified-digest>
    
  • Obtain the exact required TCP and UDP port list from the documentation corresponding to the pinned RustDesk release rather than exposing a broad or speculative port range.
  • Restrict published ports with host firewall rules and allow access only from trusted source networks.
  • Run the container as a non-root user where supported.
  • Drop unnecessary Linux capabilities with --cap-drop=ALL, adding back only capabilities proven necessary.
  • Use a read-only root filesystem, no-new-privileges, resource limits, and an appropriate seccomp or AppArmor profile where compatible.
  • Place management interfaces behind a VPN or trusted private network and monitor the container for unexpected listeners and outbound connections.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Privileged Container / Container Escape

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill recommends running the RustDesk server container with '--network host', which removes network namespace isolation and exposes the container directly on the host network stack. While not a full container escape by itself, this increases blast radius, weakens isolation, and can make unintended service exposure or lateral movement easier if the containerized service is misconfigured or compromised.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Docker 一键部署
docker run --name rustdesk-server -d \
  --network host \
  rustdesk/rustdesk-server:latest

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The visible skill metadata and trigger/instruction text are entirely in Chinese, with no indication that users may interact in another language or choose a preferred locale. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy issue.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.