T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/ensure_env.sh:16- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Create a Supply-Chain Execution Risk
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/ensure_env.sh:16-20;requirements.txt:1-5
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and unhashed dependency installation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
scripts/ensure_env.sh:16-20:bash echo "[info] upgrading pip/setuptools/wheel" "$PIP" install -U pip setuptools wheel >/dev/null echo "[info] installing requirements" "$PIP" install -r "$REQ_FILE"requirements.txt:1-5:text jieba>=0.42.1 snownlp>=0.12.3 wordcloud>=1.9.3 pillow>=10.3.0 numpy>=1.26.4Technical Analysis
The setup script unconditionally downloads and installs the newest available versions accepted by broad lower-bound constraints. It also upgrades
pip,setuptools, andwheelwithout pinning their versions.No lock file, exact version constraints, package hashes, or repository restrictions are used. Consequently, the effective code installed by the setup process can change after the Skill has been reviewed. A newly compromised, malicious, or incompatible direct or transitive dependency would be accepted automatically.
Python packages can execute code during build and installation, and their modules execute code when imported. The analyzer imports
jieba,snownlp, andwordcloudduring normal execution. Therefore, a malicious accepted package release could obtain code execution even if installation itself did not trigger the payload.This does not demonstrate that any currently named dependency is malicious. The vulnerability is the lack of controls needed to ensure that the reviewed dependency set is the dependency set subsequently installed.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises an upstream package, its publishing account, its build infrastructure, or a package in the transitive dependency graph.
- The attacker publishes a malicious version satisfying one of the unrestricted
>=constraints, or compromises a packaging-tool update. - A u ...[truncated 1036 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace lower-bound constraints with exact, reviewed versions for all direct dependencies.
- Generate and commit a lock file containing the complete transitive dependency graph.
- Record trusted distribution hashes and install with hash enforcement, for example:
bash "$PIP" install --require-hashes -r requirements.lock - Pin
pip,setuptools, andwheelrather than upgrading them unconditionally on every setup. - Use a trusted, explicitly configured package index and disable unintended extra indexes.
- Review dependency updates before regenerating the lock file, ideally with automated vulnerability and provenance checks.
- Run installation and analysis as a non-privileged user in a restricted environment without unrelated secrets.
