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Security audit

Smart Meeting Assistant

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This meeting assistant does what it claims, but it can send sensitive recordings, transcripts, and the API token to an arbitrary API base URL configured in the environment.

Review before installing. Use it only for meetings you are allowed to send to AstronClaw or an approved enterprise endpoint, avoid sensitive or regulated recordings unless your organization permits it, and do not set ASTRONCLAW_API_BASE to an untrusted URL. Prefer a hardened version that validates the API host and HTTPS, uses request timeouts, warns before upload, and documents retention expectations.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/meeting_assistant.py:30
Finding

Unrestricted API Base URL Can Expose Credentials and Confidential Meeting Data

Content
View full analysis
dict: return { "Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json", } ``` ```python url = f"{DEFAULT_API_BASE}/v1/audio/transcriptions" files = {"file": (audio_path.name, audio_data)} data = {"model": "whisper-1", "language": language} headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"} if API_KEY else {} response = requests.post(url, files=files, data=data, headers=headers) ``` ```python url = f"{DEFAULT_API_BASE}/v1/chat/completions" payload = { "model": "gpt-4o", "messages": [ {"role": "system", "content": system_prompt}, {"role": "user", "content": user_message}, ], "temperature": 0.3, } response = requests.post(url, json=payload, headers=get_headers()) ``` ```python url = f"{DEFAULT_API_BASE}/v1/chat/completions" payload = { "model": "gpt-4o", "messages": [ {"role": "system", "content": system_prompt}, {"role": "user", "content": f"Please extract todos from the following meeting content:\n\n{transcript}"}, ], "temperature": 0.2, "response_format": {"type": "json_object"}, } response = requests.post(url, json=payload, headers=get_headers()) ``` ### Technical Analysis The destination used for every API request is read directly from the `ASTRONCLAW_API_BASE` environment variable. The value is not validated before the application appends an API route and submits a request. The implementation does not enforce: - The HTTPS scheme. - The documented AstronClaw hostname. - An allowlist of trusted API hosts. - ...[truncated 2262 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
str: parsed = urlparse(value) if parsed.scheme != "https": raise ValueError("The API base URL must use HTTPS") if parsed.hostname not in ALLOWED_API_HOSTS: raise ValueError("The API hostname is not approved") if parsed.username or parsed.password or parsed.fragment: raise ValueError("The API base URL contains prohibited components") return value.rstrip("/") ``` Requests should also use a finite timeout and either disable redirects or validate them explicitly: ```python response = requests.post( url, json=payload, headers=get_headers(), timeout=(5, 120), allow_redirects=False, ) ``` ]]>

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Note
Location
scripts/meeting_assistant.py:7
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (12)

Tainted flow: 'url' from os.environ.get (line 180, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The request destination is derived from ASTRONCLAW_API_BASE in the environment, so an attacker or misconfigured runtime can redirect audio uploads to an arbitrary host. Because this call sends raw meeting audio and may include a bearer token, the issue can cause silent exfiltration of sensitive meeting content and credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/meeting_assistant.py (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

python
data = {"model": "whisper-1", "language": language}
    headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"} if API_KEY else {}
    
    response = requests.post(url, files=files, data=data, headers=headers)
    
    if response.status_code != 200:
        raise Exception(f"转写失败: {response.status_code} - {response.text}")

Tainted flow: 'url' from os.environ.get (line 180, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The chat completion URL is also built from the environment-controlled API base, allowing transcript content and the Authorization header to be sent to an attacker-selected server. In this skill, transcripts may contain confidential business discussions, so endpoint redirection directly enables sensitive data exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/meeting_assistant.py (reported line 133)May include surrounding context.

python
"temperature": 0.3,
    }
    
    response = requests.post(url, json=payload, headers=get_headers())
    
    if response.status_code != 200:
        raise Exception(f"生成纪要失败: {response.status_code} - {response.text}")

Tainted flow: 'url' from os.environ.get (line 180, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This request sends extracted meeting content to a URL derived from environment input, so a malicious or compromised environment can redirect structured transcript-derived data and API credentials externally. The structured JSON output may make exfiltrated action items and ownership data especially useful to an attacker.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/meeting_assistant.py (reported line 191)May include surrounding context.

python
"response_format": {"type": "json_object"},
    }
    
    response = requests.post(url, json=payload, headers=get_headers())
    
    if response.status_code != 200:
        raise Exception(f"提取待办失败: {response.status_code} - {response.text}")

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation describes use of environment variables, local file I/O, and outbound API access, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundaries. This increases the chance of over-privileged execution or silent access to sensitive files/network resources beyond what users expect, especially in agent environments that rely on manifest-declared scopes for enforcement.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases include broad terms like '转写', '会议录音', 'meeting minutes', and 'transcribe', which are generic enough to match unrelated user requests. Overbroad invocation can cause the skill to activate unexpectedly and process local files or send content to an external API without the user intending to use this specific workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill handles meeting recordings and transcripts, which commonly contain sensitive business or personal information, yet the description does not warn users that this data may be transmitted to an external API and stored in generated files. That omission undermines informed consent and can lead to accidental disclosure of confidential meeting content, participant identities, and action items.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill uploads meeting audio and later transcript content to external services, but the CLI does not provide a clear user-facing consent or privacy warning at the time of transmission. Since meeting recordings commonly contain confidential or regulated information, users may unknowingly disclose sensitive data to third-party infrastructure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This code transmits full meeting transcripts to an external LLM API for summarization. In the context of a meeting assistant, the transmission is functional and expected, but it is still security-relevant because highly sensitive internal discussions may leave the local environment and be processed by a third party.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/meeting_assistant.py (reported line 133)May include surrounding context.

python
"temperature": 0.3,
    }
    
    response = requests.post(url, json=payload, headers=get_headers())
    
    if response.status_code != 200:
        raise Exception(f"生成纪要失败: {response.status_code} - {response.text}")

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This call sends transcript content to an external API to extract action items. Although aligned with the skill's purpose, it exposes potentially sensitive business information, names, deadlines, and decisions to a remote service, which is a real data-handling risk in security-sensitive environments.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/meeting_assistant.py (reported line 191)May include surrounding context.

python
"response_format": {"type": "json_object"},
    }
    
    response = requests.post(url, json=payload, headers=get_headers())
    
    if response.status_code != 200:
        raise Exception(f"提取待办失败: {response.status_code} - {response.text}")

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The transcription function defaults to language="zh", and the prompts/help text are written in Chinese, causing the tool to assume a specific language unless the user overrides it. The file does not indicate that this locale restriction is optional by default or justified as a region-specific tool.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The command-line interface sets --language default to zh for transcription-related commands, which enforces a locale assumption unless changed manually. This is a natural-language policy concern because users are not first offered a language choice or automatic detection.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The full-pipeline CLI path also defaults --language to zh, reinforcing a fixed locale assumption across the tool. There is no nearby justification that the skill is intentionally limited to Chinese-language use cases.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.