T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:54- Finding
Plaintext Owner Password Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments and Shell History
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 54–61
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext sensitive credential exposure
Risk Level: Highbash ## Claim for a human owner ```bash curl -s -X POST https://agency.yg3.ai/api/v1/workspaces/claim \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"email":"owner@example.com","password":"their-password"}'text ### Technical Analysis The skill instructs users or agents to place a human owner's password directly in a `curl` command-line argument. If the placeholder is replaced with an actual password, the credential may be: - Stored in the user's shell-history file. - Temporarily exposed through process-listing or process-monitoring facilities. - Captured by terminal session recording, command auditing, telemetry, or diagnostic logs. - Disclosed to other automation components that record invoked commands. Although TLS protects the request while it is transmitted to the specified HTTPS endpoint, it does not protect the password from local disclosure before transmission. The bearer token is supplied through a command-line header as well and may be exposed through similar process and logging channels, although the demonstrated password-handling instruction is the primary confirmed issue. ### Attack Path 1. A user or agent follows the workspace-claim instructions. 2. The placeholder password is replaced with the human owner's real password. 3. The command is executed in an interactive shell or through an automation environment that records commands. 4. The plaintext credential remains in shell history, command-audit records, terminal logs, or other local telemetry, or is observed while present in process arguments. 5. A local user, compromised process, monitoring component, or later attacker with access to those records extracts the credential. 6. The attacker uses the exposed password to attempt unauthorized ac ...[truncated 628 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Prefer a browser-based claim flow, OAuth, passkey, one-time claim link, or another mechanism that does not require an agent to handle a human's reusable password.
- If API-based password submission is unavoidable, prompt for the password securely without terminal echo and construct the request body through standard input or a protected file descriptor rather than a command-line argument.
- Avoid placing bearer tokens in command-line arguments when practical. Use a client or protected configuration mechanism designed to prevent secrets from entering shell history and logs.
- Disable command echoing around secret-handling operations and ensure automation, terminal recording, and HTTP debugging do not capture credentials.
- Redact
Authorizationheaders and password fields from application, proxy, audit, and diagnostic logs. - Ensure any temporary credential material has restrictive permissions and is securely removed immediately after use.
- Document token revocation and password-rotation procedures for users who may already have followed the insecure example.
