T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:68- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Downloaded and Executed Directly
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 68 and 76–78
Vulnerability Type: Unverified remote code execution throughcurl | sh
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code:
bash curl -fsSL https://github.com/sl4m3/ledgermind/releases/latest/download/install.sh | shbash curl -fsSL https://github.com/sl4m3/ledgermind/releases/latest/download/install.sh \ | sh -s -- install --non-interactive \ --config /secure/ledgermind-install.json --jsonTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions retrieve a shell script from a mutable
latestGitHub release URL and pipe it directly intosh. The downloaded script is not included in the audited package, so its behavior cannot be reviewed as part of this Skill. Its content can also change after the Skill has passed an audit.Although the documentation states that installation should proceed only when a signed 4.0 release is available, the supplied commands do not perform cryptographic signature or checksum verification. They also do not pin an immutable release version, commit, or artifact digest. Merely using HTTPS and hosting the artifact on GitHub does not establish the integrity of the publisher account or future release artifacts.
The non-interactive command additionally supplies the remote installer with a private configuration file path. Even if that file follows the documentation and contains only credential references rather than plaintext tokens, an untrusted installer executes with the user's authority and can read other files accessible to that user.
Executing installation code is necessary for the declared installation functionality, but immediately executing an unverified, mutable remote payload is not the minimum safe mechanism required to achieve that functionality.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the repository owner account, release publication process, or release artifact.
- The attacker replaces ...[truncated 1479 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the mutable
latestURL with an explicitly pinned, immutable release version. - Download the installer to a local file instead of piping it directly into a shell:
bash curl -fL --output ledgermind-install.sh \ https://github.com/sl4m3/ledgermind/releases/download/VERSION/install.sh - Publish a SHA-256 digest and a cryptographic signature for the installer through a trusted release process.
- Verify both the digest and signature before execution, using a signing key whose fingerprint is documented through an independent trusted channel.
- Abort installation if any verification fails. Do not silently fall back to another release or unsigned artifact.
- Allow the user or agent to inspect the downloaded script before explicitly approving its execution.
- Run installation with the least-privileged account capable of completing the task. Do not recommend
sudounless a specific operation demonstrably requires it. - Document the exact files, integrations, services, and permissions the installer will create or modify.
- Avoid exposing configuration to the installer until its integrity has been verified. Keep configuration permissions restricted and continue prohibiting plaintext credentials.
- Prefer distributing a reproducible, versioned package through a trusted package mechanism where artifact provenance and integrity can be validated.
- Replace the mutable
