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Security audit

Minimax Tts Gyh

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward MiniMax text-to-speech helper with expected API-key use and no hidden persistence or destructive behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the text you provide to MiniMax and exposing MINIMAX_API_KEY to this script. Prefer an isolated Python environment, consider pinning dependencies, and avoid running it on networks where a compromised vendor download URL could reach sensitive internal services.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/tts.py:98
Finding

Unvalidated Server-Provided Download URL Enables SSRF and Unbounded Downloads

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
MAX_AUDIO_BYTES: raise ValueError("Audio download exceeds the permitted size") output.write(chunk) ``` ]]>

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Note
Location
SKILL.md:24
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (9)

Tainted flow: 'HEADERS' from os.environ.get (line 18, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tts.py (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

python
print(f"   模型: {model} | 声音: {voice_id} | 语速: {speed}x")
    print(f"   文本: {text[:50]}{'...' if len(text) > 50 else ''}")

    resp = requests.post(url, headers=HEADERS, json=payload, timeout=60)
    resp.raise_for_status()
    data = resp.json()

Tainted flow: 'HEADERS' from os.environ.get (line 18, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tts.py (reported line 89)May include surrounding context.

python
for i in range(max_wait // 10):
        time.sleep(10)
        resp = requests.get(url, headers=HEADERS, params=params, timeout=30)
        resp.raise_for_status()
        data = resp.json()

Tainted flow: 'HEADERS' from os.environ.get (line 18, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tts.py (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

python
for i in range(max_wait // 10):
        time.sleep(10)
        resp = requests.get(url, headers=HEADERS, params=params, timeout=30)
        resp.raise_for_status()
        data = resp.json()

Tainted flow: 'HEADERS' from os.environ.get (line 18, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tts.py (reported line 121)May include surrounding context.

python
"""列出可用声音"""
    url = f"{API_HOST}/v1/voices"
    params = {"model": model}
    resp = requests.get(url, headers=HEADERS, params=params, timeout=10)
    print(resp.text)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation advertises use of an environment variable (MINIMAX_API_KEY) and external API access, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That creates an authorization and review gap: a runner may allow environment and network access without the skill clearly disclosing those capabilities, increasing the chance of unintended secret exposure or unvetted outbound requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tts.py (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

python
print(f"   模型: {model} | 声音: {voice_id} | 语速: {speed}x")
    print(f"   文本: {text[:50]}{'...' if len(text) > 50 else ''}")

    resp = requests.post(url, headers=HEADERS, json=payload, timeout=60)
    resp.raise_for_status()
    data = resp.json()

Tainted flow: 'download_url' from requests.get (line 108, network input) → requests.get (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The code fetches a download URL from a prior API response and then performs a second request to that URL without validating its scheme, host, or whether it stays within the trusted MiniMax domain. If the upstream response is malicious, compromised, or intercepted in some environment, this creates an SSRF-style primitive and could make the agent contact arbitrary internal or external endpoints.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tts.py (reported line 111)May include surrounding context.

python
download_url = resp.json()["file"]["download_url"]

    with open(output_path, "wb") as f:
        vr = requests.get(download_url, timeout=60)
        vr.raise_for_status()
        f.write(vr.content)
    print(f"✅ 文件已下载: {output_path}")

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The manifest description is written entirely in Chinese, which can impose a language expectation on users without indicating that the skill supports multiple languages or is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking audience. Under the policy, locale or language restrictions should be optional or clearly justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This code file contains user-facing natural-language strings such as the module description, CLI help text, status output, and error messages entirely in Chinese. The file does not offer an alternative language or explain that the tool is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking audience, which can violate a language/locale policy requiring user choice or explicit justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.