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Security audit

Edge Tts Cantonese

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill does what it claims, but it relies on unreviewed local scripts and includes a real-looking Telegram recipient example that could send private voice content to the wrong place.

Review carefully before installing. Only use this skill if you trust and can inspect the referenced local scripts, replace the Telegram chat ID with an intended recipient, and avoid sending sensitive text because the workflow may transmit content to Edge TTS and Telegram.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Tool Hijacking and SpoofingModifies or replaces tools so legitimate-looking calls execute attacker logic
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T07 · Tool Hijacking and Spoofing

Error
Location
SKILL.md:27
Finding

Execution of Unbundled and Unverifiable External Scripts

Content
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"你段文字" normal ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill delegates its substantive behavior to shell scripts at absolute paths outside the audited project. Neither script is included in the package, so their implementation, argument handling, network destinations, filesystem operations, and other side effects cannot be reviewed. The referenced files can be created or replaced independently after this skill has been audited. Consequently, a legitimate-looking voice-generation request may execute arbitrary logic controlled by whoever can modify the external script path. The use of an absolute, user-specific path also makes the skill non-portable and prevents it from establishing that the invoked executable belongs to the reviewed package. This is classified as tool hijacking because the trusted skill instruction invokes mutable external tools whose identity and integrity are not established. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker obtains write access to `/home/gabriel/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/`, or compromises the deployment process responsible for those scripts. 2. The attacker creates or replaces `edge-tts-voice-ogg.sh` or `edge-tts-telegram.sh` with malicious shell code. 3. A user requests a Cantonese voice reply, causing the agent to follow the skill instructions. 4. The agen ...[truncated 810 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:54
Finding

Hard-Coded Telegram Recipient in an Executable Example

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
`. - Require the recipient identifier to come from trusted session context rather than copied documentation. - Display the resolved recipient and obtain explicit user confirmation before transmitting content. - Validate that the identifier belongs to the intended conversation or an approved recipient allowlist. - Separate generation from transmission so users can inspect the output before sending it. - Avoid including real account identifiers, chat identifiers, tokens, or other deployment-specific values in examples. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The manifest description says the skill should trigger on 'voice reply requests,' which is broad enough to activate in contexts the user may not intend. In a skill that generates and sends audio through external services, overbroad triggering can cause unintended processing or transmission of message content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs use of Microsoft Edge TTS but does not warn that provided text may be transmitted to an external service for speech generation. Users may unknowingly send sensitive or private message content off-device, creating a privacy and data-handling risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The Telegram send workflow describes sending generated audio and message content to Telegram without any disclosure that data is being transmitted to a third-party messaging service. This is dangerous because users may assume the skill is only performing local conversion, while it can actually exfiltrate conversational content and metadata such as chat IDs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

The skill is hard-coded around Cantonese output and the zh-HK-HiuMaanNeural voice, with no indication that users can choose a different language or locale. This can violate language/locale policy when the skill is invoked for general voice replies rather than explicitly Cantonese-only requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.