T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
INFO_RUNTIME.md:7- Finding
Overbroad Access to Agent Identity and Persistent Memory Files
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
INFO_RUNTIME.md, lines 7–12
Vulnerability Type:T05: Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown ## A) Boot Read Order (OpenClaw Action List) On boot, open these workspace files and read in this order (note: `MEMORY.md` is a single Markdown file in the workspace): 1. `~/.openclaw/workspace/SOUL.md` 2. `~/.openclaw/workspace/USER.md` 3. `~/.openclaw/workspace/memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md` (today + yesterday) 4. If in MAIN SESSION, also read `~/.openclaw/workspace/MEMORY.md`Technical Analysis
The Skill mandates reading global Agent identity, user-profile, daily-memory, and long-term-memory files whenever it boots. This access is broader than the project-scoped context necessary to provide PHP development governance.
The instruction violates least-privilege and data-minimization principles by loading potentially unrelated information into the active context without establishing task necessity or requesting explicit consent. Memory files may contain personal information, secrets, prior-session details, or untrusted content. Loading them also expands the indirect prompt-injection surface: instructions previously introduced into persistent memory could influence the current engineering session.
The reviewed files do not instruct the Agent to exfiltrate this information or use it maliciously. The issue is therefore an overbroad access requirement rather than confirmed data theft.
Attack Path
- A user activates the PHP full-stack Skill for an engineering task.
- The mandatory boot sequence causes the Agent to open
SOUL.md,USER.md, recent daily-memory files, and, in a main session,MEMORY.md. - Sensitive or attacker-controlled content stored in those files enters the Agent's context even when unrelated to the requested task.
- Poisoned memory content may influence technical decisions, generated code, ...[truncated 784 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the mandatory global boot-read sequence from the Skill.
- Do not read
SOUL.md,USER.md, daily-memory files, orMEMORY.mdby default. - Restrict reads to project-scoped records that are directly necessary for the current task.
- Obtain explicit user consent before accessing persistent memory, and identify the exact files and purpose.
- Load only narrowly selected entries rather than entire memory files.
- Treat all loaded memory as untrusted data, not authoritative instructions, and prevent it from overriding system, developer, user, or Skill-level constraints.
- Redact secrets, credentials, personal data, and unrelated prior-session content before incorporating memory into the active context.
- Document retention, access-control, and deletion policies for project logs.
- Add tests or policy checks confirming that ordinary Skill activation does not access global identity or memory files.
