other
- Location
video_to_doc.py:38- Finding
Undisclosed Transmission of a Bearer Token to an External Licensing Service
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill mostly does what it claims, but normal use can send a license bearer token to an external service and auto-install unpinned dependencies without clear upfront disclosure.
Install only if you are comfortable with a third-party licensing endpoint receiving XIAPING_TOKEN, automatic unpinned dependency installation, and possible external processing of video-derived audio, screenshots, or transcripts. Prefer reviewing and manually installing pinned dependencies in an isolated environment, using environment variables instead of command-line API keys, and avoiding confidential videos unless the external services and mirror are acceptable under your policy.
video_to_doc.py:38Undisclosed Transmission of a Bearer Token to an External Licensing Service
video_to_doc.py:123Implicit Installation of Unpinned Python and npm Dependencies
scripts/transcribe_audio.py:52Whisper Model Downloads Are Redirected to an Unverified Third-Party Mirror
scripts/transcribe_audio.py:107OpenAI API Keys Can Be Supplied Through Process Command-Line Arguments
The skill reads a bearer token from an environment variable or CLI-provided token and transmits it to an external service unrelated to the core video-to-document transformation. This creates credential exposure and covert data-flow risk: users must trust a third-party endpoint with a reusable secret, and the skill metadata does not justify needing that credential to perform local conversion.
return {"valid": False, "message": "请设置 XIAPING_TOKEN 环境变量"}
try:
response = requests.post(
"https://xiaping.coze.site/api/skills/verify",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user_token}"},
json={"skill_id": SKILL_ID},
This sends the same bearer token to a remote consume endpoint to meter usage, again outside the core document-conversion function. Repeated transmission of a reusable environment credential increases the chance of leakage, misuse, or unexpected account actions if the service or endpoint is compromised.
return False
try:
response = requests.post(
"https://xiaping.coze.site/api/skills/consume",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {user_token}"},
json={"skill_id": SKILL_ID},
If the skill truly performs online license verification, remote API communication, local license caching, usage metering, and automatic dependency installation while presenting itself as a simple offline document-conversion tool, that is a meaningful security and trust issue. Hidden network activity and auto-install behavior can expose data, introduce supply-chain risk, and bypass user expectations about what the skill will execute.
If the skill truly performs online license verification, remote API communication, local license caching, usage metering, and automatic dependency installation while presenting itself as a simple offline document-conversion tool, that is a meaningful security and trust issue. Hidden network activity and auto-install behavior can expose data, introduce supply-chain risk, and bypass user expectations about what the skill will execute.
If the skill truly performs online license verification, remote API communication, local license caching, usage metering, and automatic dependency installation while presenting itself as a simple offline document-conversion tool, that is a meaningful security and trust issue. Hidden network activity and auto-install behavior can expose data, introduce supply-chain risk, and bypass user expectations about what the skill will execute.
If the skill truly performs online license verification, remote API communication, local license caching, usage metering, and automatic dependency installation while presenting itself as a simple offline document-conversion tool, that is a meaningful security and trust issue. Hidden network activity and auto-install behavior can expose data, introduce supply-chain risk, and bypass user expectations about what the skill will execute.
If the skill truly performs online license verification, remote API communication, local license caching, usage metering, and automatic dependency installation while presenting itself as a simple offline document-conversion tool, that is a meaningful security and trust issue. Hidden network activity and auto-install behavior can expose data, introduce supply-chain risk, and bypass user expectations about what the skill will execute.
If the skill truly performs online license verification, remote API communication, local license caching, usage metering, and automatic dependency installation while presenting itself as a simple offline document-conversion tool, that is a meaningful security and trust issue. Hidden network activity and auto-install behavior can expose data, introduce supply-chain risk, and bypass user expectations about what the skill will execute.
If the skill truly performs online license verification, remote API communication, local license caching, usage metering, and automatic dependency installation while presenting itself as a simple offline document-conversion tool, that is a meaningful security and trust issue. Hidden network activity and auto-install behavior can expose data, introduce supply-chain risk, and bypass user expectations about what the skill will execute.
If the skill truly performs online license verification, remote API communication, local license caching, usage metering, and automatic dependency installation while presenting itself as a simple offline document-conversion tool, that is a meaningful security and trust issue. Hidden network activity and auto-install behavior can expose data, introduce supply-chain risk, and bypass user expectations about what the skill will execute.
If the skill truly performs online license verification, remote API communication, local license caching, usage metering, and automatic dependency installation while presenting itself as a simple offline document-conversion tool, that is a meaningful security and trust issue. Hidden network activity and auto-install behavior can expose data, introduce supply-chain risk, and bypass user expectations about what the skill will execute.
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
else
echo "正在安装 ffmpeg..."
if [ "$OS" == "linux" ]; then
sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y ffmpeg
elif [ "$OS" == "macos" ]; then
brew install ffmpeg
fi
The README states that speech transcription can use an online API, but it does not warn users that video audio may be transmitted to a third-party service. Because these videos may contain sensitive business processes, credentials spoken aloud, or personal data, the omission can lead to unintended data disclosure and privacy/compliance issues.
The skill describes operations that inherently require reading local files, writing outputs, invoking shell commands, and potentially using networked transcription services, yet it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions boundaries. This increases the attack surface because an agent may be granted broader capabilities than users expect, with no least-privilege constraint documented in the skill manifest.
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
# 安装 ffmpeg(视频处理)
# Ubuntu/Debian
sudo apt install ffmpeg
# macOS
brew install ffmpeg
The skill processes screenshots and audio transcripts that may contain sensitive UI data, credentials, personal information, or confidential spoken content, and it explicitly routes screenshots to platform image analysis and may use external transcription APIs. Without a clear privacy warning and data-handling notice, users may unknowingly expose sensitive information to third-party or platform services.
The guide explicitly recommends using the OpenAI Whisper API to transcribe extracted audio, but it does not warn users that audio contents may be sent to a third-party service and may contain sensitive speech, credentials, customer data, or internal business information. In a video-to-document workflow, uploaded audio is especially likely to originate from enterprise training or system-demo recordings, so omission of privacy and data-handling guidance creates a meaningful data exposure risk.
The ffmpeg command uses the '-y' flag, which forces overwriting output files in the target directory. Although the script prints progress messages, it does not clearly disclose to the user that existing matching JPEG files may be replaced without confirmation.
The script invokes sudo to run apt update and apt install, which requests elevated privileges and executes package management actions as root. While common for dependency installation, embedding privileged operations in a convenience script increases the blast radius if the script is modified, misread, or run in an unexpected environment.
else
echo "正在安装 ffmpeg..."
if [ "$OS" == "linux" ]; then
sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y ffmpeg
elif [ "$OS" == "macos" ]; then
brew install ffmpeg
fi
The script performs system-level package installation with sudo and non-interactive flags, which changes the host environment without an explicit confirmation step or warning. In a skill installer context, this is risky because users may execute it expecting a harmless setup helper, but it can modify system packages and trigger privileged operations immediately.
The script installs Python packages directly into the active environment without checking whether it is a virtual environment or obtaining confirmation. This can overwrite or contaminate the user's global Python setup, creating dependency conflicts or unexpected package execution paths.
This code file contains natural-language documentation and runtime messages entirely in Chinese, including the module description and usage text. The file does not offer a language choice or explain that it is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking or region-specific environment, which can violate a language/locale policy requiring opt-in or justification.
The script sends raw transcript text to third-party LLM providers when API keys are present, but provides no explicit consent flow, privacy notice, redaction, or control over what content is shared. In this skill’s context, transcripts may contain sensitive spoken operational details, personal data, account identifiers, or business information, so external transmission creates a real confidentiality and compliance risk.
The file-level documentation says the script automatically chooses among dynamic interval, scene detection, and voice alignment strategies. However, the implemented logic only inspects whether audio exists and never uses audio timing, transcription, or alignment to drive extraction, so the documentation actively overstates what the code does.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
"-show_format", "-show_streams",
video_path
]
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
info = json.loads(result.stdout)
duration = float(info["format"]["duration"])