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Security audit

LinkedIn Poster

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill clearly does what it says, but it posts publicly to LinkedIn and uses an unsafe shell placeholder pattern that could execute unintended local commands if post text is inserted directly.

Review carefully before installing. Use this only if you are comfortable storing a LinkedIn publishing token and having the agent post publicly to your LinkedIn account. Do not paste untrusted or externally supplied post text into the provided curl command; a safer version should build JSON with a serializer such as jq and require confirmation of the account, content, and visibility before posting.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:52
Finding

Shell Command Injection Through Unsafe LinkedIn Post Text Substitution

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

3. Get Your Person URN

bash
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  "https://api.linkedin.com/v2/userinfo"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

bash
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  "https://api.linkedin.com/v2/userinfo"

Look for the "sub" field — this is your Person URN (format: urn:li:person:XXXXX).

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 70)May include surrounding context.

bash
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_ACCESS_TOKEN" \
  "https://api.linkedin.com/v2/userinfo"

Look for the "sub" field — this is your Person URN (format: urn:li:person:XXXXX).

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill facilitates posting directly to LinkedIn and sets visibility to PUBLIC, but it does not clearly warn users at the point of use that content will be published externally and publicly. This increases the risk of accidental disclosure, unintended publication, or users invoking the skill without understanding that it performs a live social-media action.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.