T06 · System Persistence
- Location
SKILL.md:87- Finding
Persistent OpenClaw Scheduled Tasks
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This stock-analysis skill mostly does what it says, but it publishes a real-looking API token and encourages persistent scheduled agent runs without enough safeguards.
Install only after replacing the embedded Tushare token with your own securely stored token, avoiding system-wide dependency installation, and treating the cron examples as optional recurring automation that should have explicit names, expiry, and removal commands.
SKILL.md:87Persistent OpenClaw Scheduled Tasks
SKILL.md:134Hard-Coded Tushare API Credential
SKILL.md:14Unpinned and System-Wide Third-Party Dependency Installation
The README includes a concrete Tushare API token and states it is already configured, which encourages users to reuse an exposed secret. Publishing live credentials in documentation can lead to unauthorized API use, quota exhaustion, billing abuse, and compromise of any data or account actions tied to that token.
The README embeds a real-looking Tushare access token in a way that promotes disclosure and reuse of sensitive credentials. In the context of an agent skill, documentation is often copied verbatim into deployments, making accidental propagation of the secret more likely across user machines, logs, and source control.
A real-looking API token is exposed directly in setup instructions with no sensitivity warning, normalizing insecure secret handling. Users may copy, redistribute, or commit the credential, and attackers can harvest it from public repositories or package indexes for unauthorized access.
The documentation exposes a hardcoded, real-looking Tushare API token and explicitly instructs users to export it into their environment. Secrets embedded in skill files are easily harvested from repositories, logs, screenshots, or downstream copies, enabling unauthorized API use, quota exhaustion, billing abuse, and possible access to associated account data or service reputation impact.
The natural-language instructions and examples are entirely in Chinese, and the file does not indicate that this language restriction is optional or region-specific. SQP-3 covers language or locale policy violations when a skill effectively forces a specific language without user opt-in.
The skill metadata and description are entirely Chinese-focused (e.g. Chinese name/slug/description) and the examples/instructions throughout the file assume Chinese-language interaction, but there is no statement offering language choice or requiring user opt-in. Under the policy, forcing a specific language or locale without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless clearly documented as a justified region-specific tool.
This code’s natural-language descriptions and user-facing outputs are consistently Chinese-only, starting from the module description and continuing throughout runtime messages. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless the locale restriction is explicitly justified.
No manifest is available, so there is no declared purpose or permission baseline to justify sensitive capability use. The code reads TUSHARE_TOKEN and FINNHUB_TOKEN from environment variables, which is a credential-access capability beyond pure local computation and should be explicitly justified by the skill's stated intent.
The documentation for screen_stocks lists criteria including roe_min and volume_ratio, implying those filters affect stock selection. However, _match_criteria only checks pe_ttm and market_cap_min, and never enforces roe_min or volume_ratio, so the documented intent contradicts actual behavior.