T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:5
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Homebrew Dependency## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, line 5 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependency and mutable supply-chain source **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```yaml metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"👀","os":["darwin"],"requires":{"bins":["peekaboo"]},"install":[{"id":"brew","kind":"brew","formula":"steipete/tap/peekaboo","bins":["peekaboo"],"label":"Install Peekaboo (brew)"}]}} ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation configuration obtains the `peekaboo` executable from the third-party Homebrew tap `steipete/tap/peekaboo`. It does not specify an immutable version, formula revision, source commit, package checksum, or other integrity constraint. As a result, the executable retrieved during installation can change after this Skill has been reviewed. A compromise of the tap, its publishing credentials, its source repository, or an associated release artifact could cause users to install a modified executable without any corresponding change to this Skill package. The dependency is especially sensitive because the documented functionality requires macOS Screen Recording and Accessibility permissions. These permissions are legitimate for the stated UI-automation purpose, but they substantially increase the consequences of a supply-chain compromise. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the third-party Homebrew tap, its maintainer credentials, an upstream release location, or another component of the package publication process. 2. The attacker modifies the formula or referenced artifact so that it installs a malicious `peekaboo` executable. 3. A user follows the Skill installation metadata and installs `steipete/tap/peekaboo` without an immutable version or checksum verification. 4. The malicious executable is launched as the expected `peekaboo` command. 5. The user grants Screen Recording and Accessibility permissions, as instructed by the Skill and required by the advertised functionality. 6. The compromised exec ...[truncated 1074 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin installation to a reviewed, immutable release version or source commit rather than resolving the current state of a mutable tap. 2. Record and verify a cryptographic checksum for the expected release artifact before installation. 3. Prefer signed and notarized macOS release artifacts, and validate their signing identity as part of installation. 4. Document the authoritative source repository and expected publisher identity so users can verify provenance. 5. Where possible, distribute through an official or tightly controlled package repository rather than relying on a mutable third-party tap. 6. Introduce a controlled update process in which dependency changes, formula revisions, checksums, and signing identities are reviewed before the pinned version is updated. 7. Clearly explain why Screen Recording and Accessibility permissions are required, and advise users to revoke them when the tool is no longer needed.