T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:5
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Homebrew Dependency## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, line 5 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependency from a mutable package source **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code Snippet ```yaml metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🎮","requires":{"bins":["gog"]},"install":[{"id":"brew","kind":"brew","formula":"steipete/tap/gogcli","bins":["gog"],"label":"Install gog (brew)"}]}} ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill delegates installation of the `gog` executable to the third-party Homebrew tap `steipete/tap/gogcli`. The dependency declaration does not pin a reviewed version or source commit and does not specify a cryptographic checksum. As a result, the software installed when the skill is used may differ from the software that existed when this artifact was audited. If the tap, formula, upstream release infrastructure, or maintainer account is compromised, the mutable installation source could distribute modified installation logic or an altered executable. This finding does not establish that the current `gog` package is malicious. It identifies a supply-chain trust boundary that is not cryptographically constrained by the audited project. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the third-party Homebrew tap, its maintainer account, the referenced upstream distribution channel, or another component of the package publication process. 2. The attacker changes the formula or distributed artifact so that installation supplies a malicious `gog` executable or runs malicious installation logic. 3. A user follows the skill metadata and installs `steipete/tap/gogcli`. 4. The malicious executable runs in the user's environment. 5. The user subsequently configures Google OAuth credentials and authorizes one or more Workspace services. 6. Depending on the granted OAuth scopes and local execution privileges, the altered executable could access local credential material or misuse authorized Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Contacts, Sheets, or Docs operations. ### ...[truncated 701 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the dependency to a specific, reviewed release rather than relying solely on a mutable Homebrew formula. 2. Verify downloaded release artifacts using a documented cryptographic checksum or signature from a trusted source. 3. Where supported, bind the installation process to a reviewed source commit or immutable artifact. 4. Document the canonical upstream repository and release verification procedure so users can validate package provenance. 5. Regularly review the Homebrew tap, formula ownership, release source, and checksum changes. 6. Request only the Google Workspace services and OAuth scopes required for the user's intended task instead of authorizing all supported services by default. 7. Store OAuth credentials using operating-system-protected credential storage and restrict access to the relevant local files. 8. Consider separating read-only and write-capable authorization profiles to reduce the impact of a compromised CLI.