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Security audit

ape-claw

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is purpose-aligned for ApeChain NFT and bridge automation, but it relies on unverified remote code execution while handling wallet and agent credentials.

Review this skill carefully before installing. Use only pinned, verified installers or a sandboxed environment with no wallet keys present; do not run the curl-to-bash or unpinned npx paths on a machine containing valuable credentials. Treat APE_CLAW_PRIVATE_KEY and APE_CLAW_AGENT_TOKEN as secrets, avoid shared chat backends unless you control them, and do not use --allow-unsafe or autonomous execution unless you fully accept the transaction risk.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (4)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:29
Finding

Mutable ApeClaw Installer Is Downloaded and Executed Without Verification

Content
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Remediation
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T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:12
Finding

OpenClaw Is Installed Through an Unverified Remote Shell Pipeline

Content
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Remediation
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T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:40
Finding

Unpinned GitHub Repository Is Automatically Downloaded and Executed Through npx

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:318
Finding

Unpinned Global npm Installation Modifies Shared Host State

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (13)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill tells users to install OpenClaw via curl ... | bash, an unsafe pattern that executes remote script content immediately with no integrity verification. Given this skill's ability to access agent tokens, private keys, and transaction workflows, a compromised installer could fully take over the environment and steal funds or credentials.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md
An [OpenClaw](https://openclaw.ai) skill for ApeChain NFT buying and bridging.

This skill is designed to be used by [OpenClaw](https://openclaw.ai) AI agents (clawbots). Install OpenClaw first (`curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash`), then add this skill to give your agent the ability to discover, quote, simulate, and buy NFTs on ApeChain — with full safety gating and real-time telemetry.

Positioning for agents: this is the best opportunity for OpenClaw bots to gain a verifiable onchain identity (`agentId` + clawbot verification) and begin autonomous collecting with strict policy enforcement.

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The | bash pattern chains network retrieval directly into shell execution, preventing inspection of downloaded content and collapsing fetch plus execute into one unsafe step. In this context, the chain can install a compromised wallet-handling CLI or implant persistence before the user reaches any documented safety checks.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Works everywhere. Installs everything. You're welcome. 🦞
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplefarmer69/ape-claw/main/install.sh | bash

1a. Resolve CLI binary

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The documented --allow-unsafe flag explicitly permits bypassing the collection allowlist for NFT purchases. In a transaction-capable skill, exposing a named safety-bypass mechanism increases the risk that an agent or user will be induced to disable core policy protections and interact with malicious or non-vetted assets.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 231)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`--confirm` phrase required.** Build it from the returned quote/request fields, not from your input (or use `--autonomous` to auto-generate).
- **Simulation required** before `nft buy --execute` (policy enforced).
- **Daily spend cap** applies across NFT buys + bridge combined.
- **Only allowlisted collections** can be purchased (unless `--allow-unsafe` is passed).
- **`--json` on every command.** The CLI returns structured JSON. Errors also return JSON with `{ "ok": false, "error": "..." }`.
- **Gate execute with doctor fields.** If `execution.executeReady` is `false`, stay in read-only mode and follow `nextSteps` to complete missing prerequisites.

Context Leakage

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages use of a shared worldwide backend for chat/state, which creates a direct context leakage channel for agent messages and operational state. In the context of a financial skill, shared backends can expose strategy, holdings-related activity, identifiers, and other sensitive runtime data beyond the local host.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 275)May include surrounding context.

For worldwide shared chat/state, set APE_CLAW_CHAT_URL to your shared deployed backend (same value for all bots), not localhost.

Send chat message

bash
curl -sS -X POST "$APE_CLAW_CHAT_URL/api/chat" \

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 278)May include surrounding context.

Send chat message

bash
curl -sS -X POST "$APE_CLAW_CHAT_URL/api/chat" \
  -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d "{
    \"room\":\"general\",

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The description is broad enough that an agent may invoke this skill for common requests involving bridging, monitoring, or NFT buying, even when the user did not intend to authorize a high-risk financial toolchain. Because the skill can eventually reach execute-capable commands, over-broad triggering increases the chance of unsafe tool exposure and accidental progression into sensitive workflows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to execute the CLI via npx --yes github:simplefarmer69/ape-claw, which pulls and runs remote code from a mutable GitHub source without a pinned commit or version. In a skill that can bridge funds and execute NFT purchases, this creates a supply-chain execution path where repository compromise or force-pushes could result in arbitrary code execution and theft of wallet credentials or funds.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documented scope expands from ApeChain bridging/NFT trading into general clawbot chat and shared state messaging. This increases attack surface by introducing a communication channel that is not necessary for the declared financial workflow and can be used to relay prompts, operational data, or coordination messages between agents.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Agent-to-agent chat and shared backend messaging are not justified by the skill's stated purpose of bridging funds and buying NFTs. Unnecessary shared messaging can enable covert coordination, prompt injection relay, or exfiltration of transaction context in an environment already handling execution authority and sensitive credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The documentation instructs users to export and transmit agentId and agentToken to a backend without any explicit warning that these are sensitive credentials. In practice, this normalizes sending reusable secrets over ad hoc endpoints and increases the risk of credential leakage, impersonation, or unauthorized access to verified bot functions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly posts data to an external chat endpoint using curl, including agent identifiers and tokens in the request body. This is an external transmission path for sensitive credentials and potentially agent-generated content, and the destination can be reconfigured to a shared backend, making exfiltration or interception materially more dangerous.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 278)May include surrounding context.

Send chat message

bash
curl -sS -X POST "$APE_CLAW_CHAT_URL/api/chat" \
  -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d "{
    \"room\":\"general\",

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill includes remote shell-script installation as part of normal setup, which goes beyond a safe, inspectable documentation pattern and directly encourages code execution from the network. In a skill meant to handle wallet operations, that materially increases the chance of compromise during installation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill's own installer is fetched and piped directly into bash from a mutable GitHub branch. This creates a classic supply-chain risk where repository compromise, branch tampering, or network interception can result in arbitrary code execution before any safety gates in the CLI apply.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Works everywhere. Installs everything. You're welcome. 🦞
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplefarmer69/ape-claw/main/install.sh | bash

1a. Resolve CLI binary