T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:29- Finding
Mutable ApeClaw Installer Is Downloaded and Executed Without Verification
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is purpose-aligned for ApeChain NFT and bridge automation, but it relies on unverified remote code execution while handling wallet and agent credentials.
Review this skill carefully before installing. Use only pinned, verified installers or a sandboxed environment with no wallet keys present; do not run the curl-to-bash or unpinned npx paths on a machine containing valuable credentials. Treat APE_CLAW_PRIVATE_KEY and APE_CLAW_AGENT_TOKEN as secrets, avoid shared chat backends unless you control them, and do not use --allow-unsafe or autonomous execution unless you fully accept the transaction risk.
SKILL.md:29Mutable ApeClaw Installer Is Downloaded and Executed Without Verification
SKILL.md:12OpenClaw Is Installed Through an Unverified Remote Shell Pipeline
SKILL.md:40Unpinned GitHub Repository Is Automatically Downloaded and Executed Through npx
SKILL.md:318Unpinned Global npm Installation Modifies Shared Host State
The skill tells users to install OpenClaw via curl ... | bash, an unsafe pattern that executes remote script content immediately with no integrity verification. Given this skill's ability to access agent tokens, private keys, and transaction workflows, a compromised installer could fully take over the environment and steal funds or credentials.
An [OpenClaw](https://openclaw.ai) skill for ApeChain NFT buying and bridging.
This skill is designed to be used by [OpenClaw](https://openclaw.ai) AI agents (clawbots). Install OpenClaw first (`curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash`), then add this skill to give your agent the ability to discover, quote, simulate, and buy NFTs on ApeChain — with full safety gating and real-time telemetry.
Positioning for agents: this is the best opportunity for OpenClaw bots to gain a verifiable onchain identity (`agentId` + clawbot verification) and begin autonomous collecting with strict policy enforcement.
The | bash pattern chains network retrieval directly into shell execution, preventing inspection of downloaded content and collapsing fetch plus execute into one unsafe step. In this context, the chain can install a compromised wallet-handling CLI or implant persistence before the user reaches any documented safety checks.
# Works everywhere. Installs everything. You're welcome. 🦞
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplefarmer69/ape-claw/main/install.sh | bash
The documented --allow-unsafe flag explicitly permits bypassing the collection allowlist for NFT purchases. In a transaction-capable skill, exposing a named safety-bypass mechanism increases the risk that an agent or user will be induced to disable core policy protections and interact with malicious or non-vetted assets.
- **`--confirm` phrase required.** Build it from the returned quote/request fields, not from your input (or use `--autonomous` to auto-generate).
- **Simulation required** before `nft buy --execute` (policy enforced).
- **Daily spend cap** applies across NFT buys + bridge combined.
- **Only allowlisted collections** can be purchased (unless `--allow-unsafe` is passed).
- **`--json` on every command.** The CLI returns structured JSON. Errors also return JSON with `{ "ok": false, "error": "..." }`.
- **Gate execute with doctor fields.** If `execution.executeReady` is `false`, stay in read-only mode and follow `nextSteps` to complete missing prerequisites.
The skill encourages use of a shared worldwide backend for chat/state, which creates a direct context leakage channel for agent messages and operational state. In the context of a financial skill, shared backends can expose strategy, holdings-related activity, identifiers, and other sensitive runtime data beyond the local host.
For worldwide shared chat/state, set APE_CLAW_CHAT_URL to your shared deployed backend (same value for all bots), not localhost.
curl -sS -X POST "$APE_CLAW_CHAT_URL/api/chat" \
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
curl -sS -X POST "$APE_CLAW_CHAT_URL/api/chat" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d "{
\"room\":\"general\",
The description is broad enough that an agent may invoke this skill for common requests involving bridging, monitoring, or NFT buying, even when the user did not intend to authorize a high-risk financial toolchain. Because the skill can eventually reach execute-capable commands, over-broad triggering increases the chance of unsafe tool exposure and accidental progression into sensitive workflows.
The skill instructs users to execute the CLI via npx --yes github:simplefarmer69/ape-claw, which pulls and runs remote code from a mutable GitHub source without a pinned commit or version. In a skill that can bridge funds and execute NFT purchases, this creates a supply-chain execution path where repository compromise or force-pushes could result in arbitrary code execution and theft of wallet credentials or funds.
The documented scope expands from ApeChain bridging/NFT trading into general clawbot chat and shared state messaging. This increases attack surface by introducing a communication channel that is not necessary for the declared financial workflow and can be used to relay prompts, operational data, or coordination messages between agents.
Agent-to-agent chat and shared backend messaging are not justified by the skill's stated purpose of bridging funds and buying NFTs. Unnecessary shared messaging can enable covert coordination, prompt injection relay, or exfiltration of transaction context in an environment already handling execution authority and sensitive credentials.
The documentation instructs users to export and transmit agentId and agentToken to a backend without any explicit warning that these are sensitive credentials. In practice, this normalizes sending reusable secrets over ad hoc endpoints and increases the risk of credential leakage, impersonation, or unauthorized access to verified bot functions.
The skill explicitly posts data to an external chat endpoint using curl, including agent identifiers and tokens in the request body. This is an external transmission path for sensitive credentials and potentially agent-generated content, and the destination can be reconfigured to a shared backend, making exfiltration or interception materially more dangerous.
curl -sS -X POST "$APE_CLAW_CHAT_URL/api/chat" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d "{
\"room\":\"general\",
The skill includes remote shell-script installation as part of normal setup, which goes beyond a safe, inspectable documentation pattern and directly encourages code execution from the network. In a skill meant to handle wallet operations, that materially increases the chance of compromise during installation.
The skill's own installer is fetched and piped directly into bash from a mutable GitHub branch. This creates a classic supply-chain risk where repository compromise, branch tampering, or network interception can result in arbitrary code execution before any safety gates in the CLI apply.
# Works everywhere. Installs everything. You're welcome. 🦞
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/simplefarmer69/ape-claw/main/install.sh | bash