Coda.io

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 10, 2026 · 7:58 PM UTC
• Version: 1.2.0

Overview

This appears to be a legitimate Coda API helper, but it exposes live delete, sharing, publishing, and automation actions without built-in confirmation or strong scoping.

Install only if you are comfortable giving the agent a Coda API token with access to your docs. Use the least-privilege token/account available, prefer read-first workflows, and manually confirm any delete, share, publish, permission, or automation action before it is run.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: scripts/coda.sh:50

Finding

Unsafe JSON Construction from Untrusted Command-Line Arguments

Content

View full analysis

Remediation

View remediation

&2 exit 1 ;; esac body="$(jq -n \ --arg access "$3" \ --arg email "$2" \ '{access: $access, principal: {type: "email", email: $email}}')" _post -d "$body" "$BASE/docs/$1/acl/permissions" ``` Additional hardening measures should include: 1. Validate resource identifiers against the documented Coda identifier format where practical. 2. Validate email addresses before permission mutations. 3. Reject control characters and unreasonable argument lengths. 4. Require explicit confirmation before destructive or access-control operations when the script is used interactively. 5. Add regression tests using quotation marks, backslashes, newlines, and JSON structural characters in every text argument. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (6)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 88% confidence

Finding

The skill explicitly instructs use of shell scripts and direct curl commands but does not declare any tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. That omission weakens containment and review because an agent may invoke shell-based operations with network access and credentials without an explicit permission model.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 89% confidence

Finding

The skill promotes write, update, delete, and share capabilities against live Coda documents but does not warn about destructive or externally visible effects. In an agent setting, that increases the chance of unintended data modification, permission changes, or disclosure because risky operations are normalized without requiring explicit user confirmation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

• valueFormat: simple (default), simpleWithArrays, rich for structured data.
• Doc ID from URL: https://coda.io/d/Title_d<DOC_ID> → the part after _d is the doc ID.

Direct curl (when script doesn't cover it)

bash

curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CODA_API_TOKEN" \

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The reference documents destructive and privilege-changing operations such as deleting docs, folders, pages, rows, changing ACL permissions, publishing, and triggering automations, but it provides no safety guidance about confirmation, authorization checks, or the consequences of invoking them. In an agent skill context, this increases the chance that an LLM-driven workflow will perform high-impact actions from ambiguous or prompt-injected user requests without adequate guardrails.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 92% confidence

Finding

The script provides a delete-doc command that irreversibly deletes a document, but there is no confirmation prompt and no nearby warning comment or user-facing disclosure beyond the terse usage text. Under the code-file criteria, destructive operations should have some visible warning unless clearly disclosed; here the help text also omits any caution about deletion impact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 91% confidence

Finding

Both delete-row and delete-rows perform destructive API deletions, but the script does not present a confirmation prompt or any warning comment/help text indicating that rows will be permanently removed. The current usage strings describe arguments only and do not disclose the destructive nature of the action.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.