summarizer2

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 15, 2026 · 1:37 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill is a straightforward wrapper for a summarization CLI, but users should understand that documents, URLs, and media may be processed by external services.

Install only if you trust the third-party summarize Homebrew tap and the model or extraction services you configure. Do not summarize confidential, regulated, or private local files or URLs unless you are comfortable with their contents being sent to the selected provider or fallback service.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:5

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Homebrew Dependency

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 5
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependency from a mutable third-party Homebrew tap
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet:

yaml

metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🧾","requires":{"bins":["summarize"]},"install":[{"id":"brew","kind":"brew","formula":"steipete/tap/summarize","bins":["summarize"],"label":"Install summarize (brew)"}]}}

Technical Analysis

The installation metadata directs users or an automated agent to install steipete/tap/summarize from a third-party Homebrew tap. The dependency is not pinned to an immutable version or source revision, and the Skill does not specify a cryptographic checksum or signature to verify the downloaded artifact.

Because the formula and its referenced artifacts can change independently after this Skill has been reviewed, the code ultimately installed and executed may differ from the audited configuration. The project contains only SKILL.md; therefore, the external formula, installation logic, and resulting summarize executable were not available for inspection. This finding identifies a supply-chain trust weakness and does not establish that the current upstream package is malicious.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the third-party Homebrew tap, its maintainer account, or an artifact location referenced by its formula.
2. The attacker modifies the mutable formula or replacement artifact to include malicious installation logic or executable code.
3. A user or automation system follows the Skill metadata and installs steipete/tap/summarize.
4. Homebrew retrieves the compromised formula or artifact without an immutable version and project-defined integrity check.
5. Malicious installation code or the substituted summarize binary executes with the permissions of the installing user.
6. When invoked, the compromised executable may access local files supplied for summarization and credentia ...[truncated 792 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Pin the dependency to a reviewed, immutable release or source commit rather than relying on the mutable head of a third-party tap.
• Verify downloaded artifacts with a trusted cryptographic checksum or signature.
• Prefer an official, trusted distribution channel where available.
• Record the exact approved version and integrity value in the Skill metadata or accompanying installation documentation.
• Review the Homebrew formula, its installation hooks, and all transitive artifacts before approval.
• Run the CLI with least privilege and avoid exposing unrelated secrets in its environment.
• Isolate processing of untrusted URLs and files in a sandbox or restricted container.
• Establish an update-review process so dependency changes are audited before deployment.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 93% confidence

Finding

The skill explicitly encourages summarizing URLs, local files, PDFs, images, audio, and YouTube links using external model providers and optional fallback services, but it does not warn users that the referenced content may be transmitted to third parties. This creates a real privacy and data-handling risk because users may unknowingly send sensitive local documents, private URLs, or regulated content to external APIs and auxiliary services such as Firecrawl or Apify.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.