T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
requirements.txt:1- Finding
Unbounded Third-Party Dependency Version
- Content
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=2.25.0 ``` Related installation instructions in `SKILL.md:19` and `README.md:9`: ```bash pip install requests ``` ### Technical Analysis The dependency declaration accepts every `requests` release from version 2.25.0 onward. The project does not provide a lockfile, an upper version boundary, or cryptographic hashes for dependency verification. The documented direct installation command similarly resolves whichever package version is available from the configured Python package index at installation time. Consequently, the installed dependency set can change without any modification to the audited project. If a permitted future release or the package distribution channel is compromised, users may install code that was not included in this audit. This is a supply-chain integrity weakness rather than evidence that the current `requests` package is malicious. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a future permitted `requests` distribution, a dependency selected by it, or the package index used by the victim. 2. A user follows the documented installation command or installs from `requirements.txt`. 3. Because the dependency is not pinned and no hashes are enforced, the resolver accepts the attacker-controlled release. 4. Malicious installation or runtime code executes in the context of the user running `pip` or the BTC tracker. 5. The malicious package can access resources available to that user, including local files, environment variables, and network connectivity. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the account performing installation or running the ...[truncated 464 chars]- Remediation
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